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Managing the Development of Complex Engineering Systems 
Thomas Allen and Ralph Katz 
One of the more difficult problems facing developers of complex engineering systems 
stems from the degree of interdependence among subsystems and components that is 
inherent in such systems.  This interdependence can be the result of physical 
interdependence, designed into the system architecture, or it can result from the 
interrelations among the tasks to be performed during development.  (This task must be 
completed before that one is begun; the results of this test will determine how we 
accomplish that task, etc.).  The handling of these interdependencies is one of the major 
(arguably the major) responsibilities of the project manager for the development.  A 
simple one-sentence definition of a project manager’s job is that, “A project manager 
manages interdependencies.” 
 
The difficulty of this assignment is the result of a number of factors.  The first, of course, 
is the degree of interdependence designed into the architecture.  Equally important is the 
way in which the overall development problem has been partitioned.  The latter is only 
partially independent of the former.  Project managers have some control over both of 
these factors but usually more over the second.  A problem can often be partitioned in 
several ways and tasks assigned accordingly.  Some partitionings will result in greater 
interdependence, others in less.  Thus, the project manager can make his job easier or 
more difficult.  Experienced project managers learn this and simplify their jobs by 
assigning tasks to minimize interdependencies among team members. 
 
A second factor that affects the difficulty of the project manager’s job lies in the nature of 
the technologies incorporated into or embodied in the system.  If the system is based 
upon mature, stable technologies, the job is easier than when it is based upon dynamic, 
rapidly building technologies.  In the latter case, there is, in addition to the need for 
coordination to manage interdependencies, a need to stay abreast of technological 
developments.   In the former, the project manager can concentrate on the task of 
coordination without the distraction of worrying over changes in technology. 
 
It is the need to accomplish both coordination and knowledge maintenance that led to the 
development of the product development matrix organization1.  A major issue in the 
product development matrix is that of "balance" and the definition of responsibilities for 
project managers and departmental (or functional) management.  One can argue (and 
many have) that the two sides of the matrix should be balanced.  On the other hand, Clark 
and Fujimoto, (19--), in their study of the automobile industry show evidence for the 
effectiveness of what they label "heavyweight" project managers in effect, arguing for 
imbalance.  While these views apparently conflict, it is possible that each may hold true 
for a particular type of project.  When complexity (measured by the degree of 
interdependence among components or tasks) is high, the importance of project 
management increases and project managers may assume or be given greater authority. 
                                                 
1 No one knows, for certain, the origin of the matrix, but the author strongly suspects it was T. Wilson of 
Boeing who first organized it in the late 1950s.  
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When technologies are changing very rapidly, the departments responsible for these 
technologies increase in their importance and departmental management may assume or 
be given greater authority.  The need for flexibility, pointed out by De Neufville, may 
also require greater influence from departments, since it is departmental research that is 
most likely to produce alternatives2.  Other "ilities", for example maintainability may best 
be introduced through project management since project management provides the 
interface with other functions such as technical service and manufacturing.  This paper 
will lay out a research project to test these hypotheses and will provide a limited 
preliminary test, using data, collected for another purpose on a large sample of projects 
from 10 U.S. organizations.  Projects will be divided on the basis of size and estimated 
complexity and analyzed to see whether these differences are reflected in the degree of 
authority given to project and departmental management and whether there is any relation 
between the allocation of authority and project performance, as judged by senior 
management. 
 
Preliminary results indicate that in the majority of the projects organizational influence 
and authority over technical decisions and were balanced between project and 
departmental management.  At the same time, on more complex projects, performance is 
significantly higher when project managers have more influence over technical decisions.  
On smaller, less complex projects, performance is higher when project managers have 
more organizational “clout”. 
 
The first of these results may seem surprising, since on large, complex projects one 
would doubt a project manager’s ability to understand all of the technologies that are 
involved and might devolve decision making to the departmental experts.  Given the 
interdependencies that are present in such projects, such a strategy could miss the “big 
picture” and lead to decisions that while optimal at the technology or subsystem level are 
far from optimal at the system level.  Project management, having a better understanding 
of the complexities at this level is therefore better suited to making technical decisions at 
the system level. 
 
The second result is a little more difficult to understand and will merit further 
exploration.  Additional comparisons on the basis of size and complexity will also be 
pursued. 
 
                                                 
2 Project managers, and their teams, suffer an often fatal commitment to their existing design and tend to 
awaken to new alternatives far too late (Cf. Allen and Katz 19--; Allen 19--). 
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Learning From Organizational Experience 
John S. Carroll, MIT Sloan School of Management, Jenny W. Rudolph, Boston 
College Carroll School of Management, Sachi Hatakenaka, MIT Sloan School of 
Management 
MIT Engineering Systems Division Symposium, May, 2002 
 
Extended Abstract 
 
Learning-in-action, the cyclical interplay of thinking and doing, is increasingly important 
for organizations as environments and required capabilities become more complex and 
interdependent.  Organizational learning involves both a desire to learn and supportive 
structures and mechanisms. We draw upon three case studies from the nuclear power and 
chemical industries to illustrate a four-stage model of organizational learning.  In the first 
or “local” stage, knowledge is based primarily on the experience and skill of individuals.  
Learning is decentralized, closely tied to work tasks, and adaptive to performance 
outcomes.  In the second or “control” stage, there is an emphasis on formalization and 
standardization through compliance with rules.  Knowledge is organized in terms of 
disciplinary expertise.  Learning is understood as a set of routines for training, 
performance feedback, statistical process control, after action review, procedure revision, 
and so forth.  In the third or “open” stage, organizations recognize that routines cannot be 
written for all activities and all contingencies and that rapidly changing demands require 
flexibility, acknowledgement of doubt, and broad participation in learning.   The open 
stage is based on attitudes and cultural values of involvement, sharing, and mutual 
respect, which provides the sense of psychological safety needed to explore and discover 
novel ideas and approaches.  However, regardless of motivation, the structures and skills 
needed for systematic inquiry and systems thinking develop gradually in the final, “deep 
learning,” stage.  
 
Conceptually, the four stages differ on whether learning is primarily single-loop or 
double-loop, i.e., whether the organization can surface and challenge the assumptions and 
mental models underlying behavior, and whether learning is relatively improvised or 
structured.  The local stage is single-loop and improvised; the control stage is similar in 
using single-loop learning to modify behavior without addressing underlying mental 
models, but it uses structured roles and processes to formalize and disseminate learning.  
The open stage begins to use double-loop learning to rethink basic assumptions and 
mental models, but in an improvised way.  The deep learning stage adds structure and 
skilled inquiry to enhance organizational learning.   Many organizations become locked 
into the control stage because the next stage requires both challenging deeply-held 
assumptions and giving up some of the perceived control that has been a strength of the 
organization. 
 
The three case studies illustrate how organizations learn differently from experience, the 
details of learning practices, and the nature of stage transitions among learning practices.  
The first case illustrates the transition from local to controlled learning at a nuclear power 
plant.  The plant conducted a problem investigation of a serious injury to a maintenance 
worker.  The investigation process was relatively new, and intended to find and fix 
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problems of any sort.  The investigation concluded that the worker had failed to pay 
attention and follow the accident prevention manual.  Recommended corrective actions 
were directed at strengthening awareness and compliance with rules.   
 
The second case illustrates the transition from the control stage to the open stage at a 
different nuclear power plant.  At this plant, the control orientation had become so 
extreme that workers who raised safety concerns felt intimidated by management.  
Management was convinced that cost reductions were not eroding safety margins and that 
concerns from employees and regulators were misdirected.  Eventually, regulators forced 
the plant to remain shut down until management could demonstrate a “safety conscious 
work environment” in which employees would feel safe raising concerns and 
management would act appropriately to evaluate and address concerns.  The shift to an 
open learning environment took years of effort, changes in management, training in new 
ways of thinking and acting, development of trust and broad participation, and new 
structures to measure and support safety culture.   
 
The final case illustrates the transition to deep learning at a chemical plant.  New plant 
management adopted a highly sophisticated and labor intensive problem investigation 
process as a way to improve plant performance and gain deeper understanding of 
technical and human issues at the plant.  We illustrate this learning process in the analysis 
of a major fire.  The investigation appears on the surface to be the introduction of new 
investigation and analysis techniques, but upon deeper reflection it represents a 
negotiated interaction among managers and workers, and among multiple worker groups, 
to achieve a new relationship of openness and collaborative engagement. The collective 
analysis of factual details (with a disciplined logic that identified gaps) helped to drive a 
systemic understanding.  Tools such as cause-effect diagrams were boundary objects 
negotiated by the investigation team in a process of knowing that helped surface 
previously unarticulated mental models of the work environment, compare them, and 
arrive at new, shared views.  Some of the learning was articulated in the written report, 
another boundary object negotiated between the team and managers that initiates 
corrective actions and feeds databases, but much remained unwritten (although discussed 
as part of the reporting out process). 
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The Impact of Instability on Complex Social and Technical Systems 
Joel Cutcher-Gershenfeld and Eric Rebintisch 
Submission for presentation to MIT’s Engineering Systems Division Internal Symposium 
February 2002 
 
Introduction 
 
Instability is a pervasive phenomenon that has deep implications for virtually all complex 
social and technical systems.  
 
In engineering, the identification and mitigation of various types of technical instabilities 
is a well developed practice.  This is a key focus, for example, of engineers concerned 
about the prevention of potentially destabilizing vibration in the frame of an aircraft or 
the elimination of potentially destabilizing bugs in a software program.  However, to 
nature of instability in complex social and technical systems is relatively unstudied and 
not well understood.   
 
In this paper, we present a conceptual framework for understanding instability in socio-
technical systems.  We then illustrate key concepts with data from the aerospace industry.  
Drawing on two data sets, we trace the impacts of three types of instability – 
technological, organizational and economic instability – on aerospace programs and 
production operations. 
 
Consider the case of the F-22 program, which can be understood as a complex 
engineering design and production system.  Economic instability is reflected in several 
successive budget cuts – some small and some substantial – that took place since the 
inception of the program.  This has forced the development of more than 20 program 
master plans, with far-ranging ripple effects on the prime contractors, employees, 
suppliers, communities and other stakeholders.  Technological instability is particularly 
evident in the avionics, which were first designed at a time when the fastest available 
computer chip was a 386 micro-processor.  Each major advance in computer technology 
has forced complex sets of choices around what to re-design and what to functionality to 
leave unchanged, using the older technologies.  Organizational instability is reflected in 
the merger of Lockheed, Martin Marietta, and General Dynamics into Lockheed Martin, 
as well as countless organizational initiatives, restructurings, partnerships, acquisitions, 
and leadership transitions.  Despite these significant instabilities, the requirement to 
develop and deliver a complex, advanced aircraft system never wavered. 
 
Not only must organizations develop and deliver complex systems while confronting the 
challenges of instability, they often are called on to simultaneously work to improve their 
own organizational productivity through activities such as Lean and Six-Sigma. A key 
statistical process control (SPC) principle revolves around the importance of stability (or 
at least reduced variability) as a pre-condition for improvement efforts. Most lean 
implementation frameworks urge the establishment of stability prior to the 
implementation of systems for “flow” and “pull.”  A deeper understanding of the nature 
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of instability promises useful insights into how to achieve this most important reciprocal 
condition – stability. 
 
 
Defining Instability 
 
We define instability as a dynamic pattern of stimulus and response in which events 
become successively less predictable or controllable. 
 
Classically, instability in physical systems is defined as a perturbation that is amplified by 
feedback in a divergent process – resulting in increased variability.  In the context of 
many complex social and technical systems, there may be many perturbations, many 
related and unrelated responses and great difficulty distinguishing superficial symptoms 
from underlying sources of instability. 
 
Note that stability does not necessarily mean the absence of perturbations or new 
stimulus.  It is just a state where responses to perturbations do not induce unpredictable or 
uncontrollable outcomes. 
 
 
Emerging Principles  
 
The following principles have been developed on an inductive basis – emerging from the 
data analysis and from underlying concepts: 
 
Single versus multiple sources of Instability:  Complex socio-technical systems may be 
thought of as multivariate dynamic systems.  As such, attempts to mitigate 
instabilities by focusing on one variable may actually induce more instability.  
 
Time and Instability:  Instability is a longitudinal dynamic phenomenon in which 
mitigation efforts must consider what can be termed the frequencies and harmonics 
of the underlying forcing functions, as well as the damping functions if they are to be 
successful.  Practitioners should be wary of “one-shot” interventions. 
 
Systems and Sub-Systems:  Efforts to mitigate instability at a “sub-system” level will 
have limited impact when the source(s) of instability are at the level of the larger 
system.   
 
Stakeholders:  The impact of instability varies across stakeholders, requiring multiple 
stakeholder involvement in the mitigation response (corollary to the first principle)  
 
Buffers and Root Causes:  Common responses to instability involve attempts to create 
buffers that shield social and technical systems from the effects of instability, but 
these same buffers obscure data essential to understanding root causes (corollary to 
the second principle) 
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Illustrative Data 
 
To illustrate some of the dynamics associated with instability, we present findings from 
two separate lines of research – one focusing on instability at what can be termed the 
program level instability and one on what is termed instability at the facility level.  Both 
studies are focused on the U.S. aerospace industry.  At the outset a few cautions are 
needed.  First, the focus on aerospace means that the findings may or may not be fully 
generalizable to other sectors of the economy.  Second, each of the studies involves 
cross-sectional survey research, combined with some longitudinal case study research – 
which will only partly capture important longitudinal aspects of instability.  In this 
regard, the research should be treated as illustrative rather than confirmatory. 
  
Among the key findings from the research on aerospace program instability are the 
following: 
 
• Instability has a direct and negative effect on program cost, profitability, and 
duration. 
• Multiple sources of instability (requirements, budget and technical) contribute 
roughly equally to the negative outcomes. 
• Staff turnover in key roles correlated with instability, undermining 
remediation efforts and program performance at the time when instability is 
high. 
• Implementation of cross-functional teams and other selected workplace 
innovations helped mitigate instability.  
 
Among key findings from research on instability at the aerospace facility level are the 
following: 
 
• Instability has a direct and negative effect on economic performance, skill 
development, employment and other factors 
• Facilities report a wide range of sources of instability – with preliminary evidence for 
very different effects associated with economic, technological and organizational 
types of instability 
• In implementing systems change initiatives, there is preliminary evidence for what 
has been termed a “golden middle” range of sufficient instability to unfreeze social 
relations, but not so much instability as to polarize stakeholder 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
This has been a preliminary exploration of the concept of instability.  In complex social 
and technical systems, instability is both all pervasive and highly problematic.  We have 
seen how narrowly focused responses to instability can actually increase, rather than 
mitigate the problem.  As well, buffers designed to protect against instability can hamper 
understanding of root causes.  While there are many negative impacts associated with 
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instability, it can also serve a beneficial unfreezing role – in moderation. Ultimately, a 
deeper appreciation of instability enables a more effective focus on creating stability, 
which is the foundation for continuous improvement in social and technical systems. 
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Architecting/Configuring/Designing Engineering Systems 
Using Real Options 
Richard de Neufville, Proffessor of Engineering Systems and of Civil and 
Environmental Engineering 
 
MIT Engineering Systems Symposium 
On the Intellectual Foundations of Engineering Systems 
May, 2002 
 
 
Extended Abstract 
 
All of us concerned with engineering systems face a common fundamental problem. It is: 
How do we design these systems to perform well in a constantly evolving and thus risky 
context?  As professionals concerned with the system (rather than its individual pieces) 
the design issues of course predominantly relate to the overall configuration, the 
architecture of the system.  
 
Learning how to define the appropriate architecture, to configure engineering systems 
optimally, should be a central, and indeed an urgent task for all of us.  At present we tend 
to do it suboptimally, perhaps even badly.  As a colleague in this symposium suggests: 
“In traditional space systems conceptual design, point designs are chosen 
early to pursue. This has the benefit of jump-starting downstream design 
efforts, but has severe detriments in terms of sub-optimization and the cost 
of redesign.” (Hastings et al.) 
 
How do we configure computer systems, manufacturing plants, power grids, satellite 
arrays and other systems to evolve optimally in the uncertain environment defined by 
technological shifts, changes in industry structure and market fluctuations?  In short, how 
do we design in the right kinds and amounts of flexibility into engineering systems?  
How do we guarantee that our systems are well positioned to take advantage of new 
opportunities, yet insured against poor performance in changed circumstances?  If we 
could establish a methodology for determining the appropriate system architecture, we 
might well avoid the “severe detriments” mentioned by Hastings, and achieve significant 
gains. 
 
The essential design difficulty is that, as other colleagues at this symposium indicate: 
“A system… is not a static design---it is a dynamic process that is 
continually adapting to achieve its goals and to react to changes in itself 
and in the environment.” (Leveson) 
We must, therefore learn how to explore the: 
“Tradeoffs between performance, cost, risk and schedule…during 
architecting and design of complex engineering systems.” (de Weck et al.) 
 
We do yet not know how to define, in any rigorous way, appropriately flexible system 
architectures.  We can build in reliability.  We can design for reasonable performance 
over a wide range of situations.  However, we do not have a consistent engineering 
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approach to the general problem.  Our schemes for measuring performance do not 
provide means to evaluate contingency plans.  Until we develop appropriate ways to 
value the flexibility that we can build into our systems, we can neither make informed 
decisions about flexibility nor design the systems for optimal performance. 
 
Simulation is almost certainly likely to be an essential tool to help us explore these issues.  
A broad range of new capabilities enables us to use this approach in ways previously 
unaffordable.  As another colleague points out:  
“A new generation of stochastic simulation tools capable of exploring risk 
vs. efficiency tradeoffs in large-scale…systems…is now evolving.” 
(Marks) 
 
We will need to place such tools within a larger conceptual context. This is likely to use 
some form of construct that defines an optimum portfolio of system capabilities or assets.  
It will thus probably borrow heavily from recent developments in economics in this area.  
Colleagues within the Engineering Systems Division are already working on this 
approach.  For example: 
“We have been exploring a methodology for concurrently evaluating 
uncertainties embedded in potential architectures and utilizing this 
information in the upstream conceptual design trade-offs. This 
methodology relies on the use of portfolio theory and the analogy that a 
trade space of architectures can be modeled as a marketplace of potential 
assets from which efficient portfolios can be created.” (Hastings et al) 
 
This paper explores how we might collectively approach this fundamental issue of 
designing the architecture of engineering systems.  It proposes the possibility of a 
coherent approach to the design of flexible engineering systems that can evolve optimally 
to meet new challenges and opportunities.   
 
It suggests that the methods of “options analysis”-- that have revolutionized thinking 
about investments -- can provide a conceptual basis for defining optimal configurations – 
much as Baldwin and Clark (2000) have proposed.  The fundamental element of options 
analysis is indeed the determination of the value of flexibility.  This approach defines the 
value of the “options”, of the design elements that will permit system designers and 
managers to evolve their system gracefully over time as new opportunities and risks 
unfold.   
 
When we can satisfactorily measure the value of flexibility, we will be able to determine 
the optimal kinds and amounts to incorporate into the system architecture.  We will be 
able to determine, for example, the extent to which a more modular system (providing 
flexibility) is appropriate for the particular kinds of risks and opportunities we might 
anticipate.  
 
The transposition of options analysis into the engineering context, into what is known as 
“real options,” is not direct.  Experts in finance have proposed possible approaches (see 
for example Brennan and Trigeorgis, Trigeorgis), but these do not seem adequate.  The 
issue in this regard is that many of the assumptions central to the options analysis in the 
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financial context do not apply to engineering systems.  Specifically, with regard to 
engineering systems: 
• Historical data on the volatility of the risks are generally unavailable; 
• Decision points at which the exercise price of the “real option” is known may also be 
unavailable; and 
• The risks are unlikely to evolve as Brownian processes but, on the contrary, are likely 
to change markedly even over a short time (in terms of an engineering system), for 
example as  when market responses to new products become known. 
 
An extended program of research is needed to create appropriate procedures for 
appropriately applying real options analysis to engineering systems.  We need, through 
theoretical analysis and applications to numerous cases, to adapt the financial methods of 
options analysis to the reality of engineering systems. If successful, the resulting concepts 
and procedures could fundamentally alter the way we think about engineering systems 
design. The resulting methodology for defining system architecture could provide a core 
methodology for engineering systems analysis. 
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 (1) Abstract 
 
Tradeoffs between performance, cost, risk and schedule frequently arise during 
architecting and design of complex engineering systems. Many such systems interact 
with human operators whose performance and abilities have been traditionally 
investigated in applied psychology and human factors engineering. Isoperformance is 
presented as a unifying methodology that can quantify and visualize the tradeoffs 
between determinants (independent design variables) of a known or desired outcome in 
this context. For deterministic systems the multivariable performance invariant contours 
can be computed using sensitivity analysis and contour following algorithms, provided 
that a mathematical system model of appropriate fidelity exists. In the case of stochastic 
systems the isoperformance curves can be obtained via omega-squared analysis, given a 
statistically representative data set. Once isoperformance curves have been obtained, they 
are useful in extracting a set of performance invariant solutions. Applying additional 
objectives, other than performance, can then lead to a set of pareto-optimal designs. 
Specific examples from opto-mechanical systems design and human factors engineering 
are presented. 
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Terminology: We use the word isoperformance by itself as shorthand for the 
isoperformance approach. This is a methodology for obtaining a performance invariant 
set, or a set of performance invariant curves (2D) or surfaces (>2D) given a data-analytic 
(stochastic) or deterministic model. 
 
(2) Introduction 
 
Isoperformance is based on the idea of holding a functional quantity f deemed to be 
representative of a system’s “performance” constant and plotting the contours of equal 
performance on a two-dimensional graph. The ordinate and abscissa each represent 
independent variables 1 2,x x  and the contours, of f= , indicate the function values of a 
bivariate function: 
 
 ( )1 2 1 2, ,x x f x xa  (0.1) 
 
Thus, one may represent the relationship between two variables (determinants) that 
together produce a constant effect [3]. In such a case both abscissa and ordinate represent 
determinants. An example of such a relationship that is common in meteorology is a 
pressure chart, where the contours represent the isobars, i.e. the contours of “equal” 
pressure at a given time and altitude, see Figure 1. 
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Figure 1: Sea Level Pressure [mbar] Chart: 1600 Z, Tue 9 May 2000. Here x1 is geographic longitude, x2 is 
geographic latitude and f is atmospheric pressure [1]. 
 
In this paper we are particularly interested in contours that arise, when the function f 
represents the performance of a system in a socio-technical context. Thus, f could 
represent the pointing performance of a space telescope, average gas mileage of a 
vehicle, total output of a power grid or the aptitude of humans as measured by some 
objective criterion. In economics, relationships of this type are usually called indifference 
curves [3]. In sensory psychology and physiology, they are often called isofrequency, 
isochronal or isoelectric curves or contours. These terms all share the prefix iso-, which 
means “same” . These contours are of value since they show the loci of “performance 
invariant” points in the 1 2,x x -space. 
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In the more general case we can be interested in multiple performance functions, whose 
values are determined by more than two variables. This can be expressed mathematically 
as: 
 
( )
( )
( )
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Thus, this paper presents an approach to finding a performance-invariant set I, where 
each member of the set produces the same response as the other member. The system 
response, however, is usually achieved by placing the burden on a different part of the 
system.  
 
(3) Sample Results 
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Figure 2: Bivariate isoperformance contours: Spacecraft design example, where the performance is the 
root-mean-square (RSS) line-of-sight (LOS) pointing performance of the satellite and a pointing level of 5  
m (on the focal plane) is required. The initial design po does not meet the requirement and the 
isoperformance contour can be intercepted by a combination of changes. In this example the changes 
include diminishing the reaction wheel imbalance Ud and softening the isolator stiffness K_rISO.  
 
Additional examples for multivariable isoperformance sets, and stochastic examples from 
human factors engineering will be included in the paper.  A  general approach for 
obtaining isoperformance solutions is shown below: 
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(a) deterministic Isoperformance Approach 
(b) stocha stic Isoperformance Approach 
Ind      x          y          Jz 
1        0.75   9.21   17.34 
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Figure 3: Deterministic and stochastic Isoperformance approaches. In the deterministic approach a 
mathematical system model exists and the isoperformance algorithms extract the performance invariant set 
at performance level Jz,req. The stochastic approach begins with a statistical data set from a population of 
“individuals” that exhibit certain attributes xi and responses Jz. The isoperformance algorithms use this data 
set to create an empirical system model, from which isoperformance contours are extracted. 
 
(4) Significance of Isoperformance for Engineering Systems 
 
It is often true that traditional engineering education and practice makes heavy use of 
system optimization. Optimization is, of course, an important method and spawns a 
number of algorithms (numerical gradient search, heuristic techniques like genetic 
algorithms and simulated annealing) designed to maximize or minimize certain system 
responses. In reality, however, the notion of optimality for large, complex engineering 
systems is somewhat ill defined. In the case of multiple objectives we can consider 
pareto-optimality [4].  
 
This paper argues that traditional optimization of system performance is not the only 
reasonable approach in the design of engineering systems. Isoperformance does not seek 
the extrema of system performance, but enforces that the system meet pre-determined 
performance goals (=requirements) subject to a numerical tolerance .  This is achieved 
by casting the system responses as equality constraints J(x)=Jreq. This insures that the 
system is neither over nor under-designed. What can be gained by this approach? 
 
There are three benefits for engineered systems that result from this approach: 
 
(1) By not simply performing system optimization based on a mathematical system 
model, the entire design space is explored more fully. 
 
(2) Designs that are found, within the performance invariant set, such that the burden 
for achieving the system response is well “balanced” or evenly distributed in the 
system.  
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(3) Performance as “currency”. The fact that the system is performance sub-optimal 
allows considering the difference between the “optimal” performance and the 
required performance along the isoperformance contours as an abstract resource. 
This performance margin can be viewed as a design “currency” that can be 
invested in different ways: making the system more affordable to implement, 
more robust or flexible, easier to upgrade in the future … This is the connection 
between system performance, optimization and the Illities. 
 
Performance
Schedule Risk
Cost  
 
Figure 4: Tensions during systems architecting and design, Reference: [2], page 83, Figure 5.1. Traditional 
System performance optimization pulls strongly in the performance direction at the expense of the other 
directions. Isoperformance fixes the amount of performance at an acceptable level and trades off the other 
directions with respect to each other. The paper will argue that other tradeoff-dimensions are present, 
namely the downstream influences (manufacturability, flexibility, robustness etc…) 
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Incorporating Uncertainty into Conceptual Design for Space System 
Architectures 
Daniel Hastings, Myles Walton, and Annalisa Weigel 
 
Space system architectures traditionally define “rocket science”. However, while most 
often these architectures, once constructed, deliver excellent performance, it is extremely 
rare that they deliver the initially promised performance on the initially proposed cost and 
schedule. There are several reasons for this but a large amount of the blame lies in the 
fact that there is a little understanding of how to incorporate uncertainty into the design 
process in a way allows decision makers to systematically take uncertainty into account.  
 
The development of space systems is subject to not only cost, technical and market 
uncertainties, but also to uncertainties from the policy domain.  This paper introduces an 
approach to quantify and compare space system architectures under uncertainty, with 
emphasis on policy uncertainty as well as technical uncertainty.  Two key hypotheses are 
developed and explored in this paper.  The first is that the cost of policy can be quantified 
through technical analysis of space system architectures under varying policies and the 
second is that uncertainties of space system architectures can be quantified and managed 
effectively by carrying portfolios of architectures, rather than any single architecture.   
 
Through interviews with space system architects, current methods of uncertainty analysis 
were collected, while at the same time interviews were conducted with top-level 
management and policy domain experts to uncover some of the policy uncertainties that 
have traditionally had considerable impact on space systems development.  Using the 
information collected, an approach is developed that can be used in early conceptual 
design for quantifying the effects of policy and other uncertainties on the selection of 
space systems architecture. 
 
Uncertainty analysis in conceptual design has traditionally focused on understanding the 
cost and, to some degree, technical uncertainty.  Cost uncertainty is typically calculated 
through the use of regression errors associated with cost models that are used in early 
conceptual design and are based on historical missions of similar characteristics.  
Technical uncertainty in early conceptual design has historically been incorporated in two 
ways.  The first is through the use of technology readiness levels at the subsystem or 
architecture levels.  These technology readiness levels (TRL) are used to associate 
technical maturity with historical deviations of predictions of cost and schedule on the 
operational deployment of the technology.  This is as crude as then carrying a percentage 
uncertainty associated with each TRL. The second method of technical uncertainty 
analysis is to identify major sources of risk and to develop probabilistic risk assessment 
based on individual scenarios using expert advise on probabilities and outcomes.  More 
often than not, uncertainties arising from policy are not considered in the early conceptual 
design, or when they are, there is no method for quantifying the effect on the 
architectures and including that information in the conceptual design decisions.  This 
paper provides a unifying framework for uncertainty analysis, but also a method for 
communicating the effects of policy between the political and architecture domain. 
 
 21
Enabling this approach is simulation modeling of space system architectures that are of 
interest in the design trade space.  Using computer models to quantify the performance 
and cost characteristics, tradespaces of architectural characteristics can be developed and 
analyzed.  These tradespaces are then searched to find the pareto optimal fronts in the 
space based on some criteria (e.g. minimum cost, maximum function per cost etc.)The 
simulation also allows for the propagation of uncertainty in various architectural 
characteristics and an understanding of how those uncertainties propagate to system 
evaluation criteria. 
 
The first step in the proposed approach is an analysis of the trade space of potential 
architectures.  This analysis includes bounding the problem in terms of the architectural 
concepts that will be evaluated and the bounding of the policy uncertainties and scenarios 
that will be investigated in addition to the other uncertainties that have significant impact 
on architectural evaluation.  The second step is to adjust the models to reflect the effects 
of these uncertainties of interest on the simulation.  The third step is to quantify the 
impact of the uncertainties on the system evaluation criteria for each architecture of 
interest. Finally, we incorporate portfolio theory as an approach to manage uncertainty 
effectively. 
 
To illustrate the approach in practice, we use several case studies. We examine the effect 
of the cost of US launch policy on space launch architectures. We examine the effect of 
various types of uncertainty on a military space based radar mission. We compare and 
contrast the choices of architectures on the basis of performance and on the basis of 
minimizing uncertainty. Finally we also consider a commercial case of a broadband space 
architecture and consider the choice of architectural portfolios when uncertainty is 
minimized versus other choices that may be made. 
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A New Control-Based Model of Accidents 
Nancy G. Leveson 
 
Accident models underlie all hazard analysis, accident investigation, fault tolerance and 
safety design, and risk assessment techniques.   Virtually all current safety engineering 
and risk assessment techniques are based on an underlying model that views accidents in 
terms of a forward chain of events over time.  The chain may be branching (e.g., fault 
trees or event trees) or there may be parallel chains, but the relationship is almost always 
a direct, linear one and the events considered involve some type of component failure, 
human error, or energy-related event.  It is difficult or impossible to incorporate into such 
models factors other than simple failure events and conditions, such as structural 
deficiencies in the organization, factors related to the safety culture in the industry, 
management deficiencies, cognitively complex human decision-making involving 
complex feedback relationships and interactions, and adaptation and degeneration of 
safety defenses over time. 
 
In addition, chain of events models work best for component failure accidents, where one 
or several components fail, leading to a system failure or hazard.  The extraordinary 
interactive complexity of the systems we are trying to build as well as the introduction of 
new technology, particularly digital technology, have led to a new type of accident, called 
"system accidents" by Perrow, that arises in the interactions among components 
(electromechanical, digital, and human) rather than simply the failure of individual 
components.  While better engineering techniques, often involving redundancy, are 
reducing accidents related to hardware failure, system accidents are increasing in 
importance and will require new prevention approaches.   
 
In this paper, a new model of accidents is proposed based on control theory.  Instead of 
specifying the causal factors of accidents in terms of failure events and attempting to 
prevent those events by using various types of redundancy, accidents are seen as resulting 
from flawed processes operating within the overall socio-technical system.  A significant 
difference from other models is the inclusion of the social system in the model.  This 
feature allows considering such factors as the "safety culture" and management flaws in 
the investigation or prevention of accidents. 
 
In the new model, systems are viewed as interrelated components that are kept in a state 
of dynamic equilibrium by feedback loops of information and control. Safety is an 
emergent property that must be controlled at each level of the socio-technical control 
structure by imposing the constraints necessary to limit the behavior of the process at the 
level below to safe changes and adaptations.  Accidents result from inadequate control or 
enforcement of constraints on safety-related behavior.  Accidents can be understood, 
therefore, in terms of why the controls that were in place did not prevent or detect 
maladaptive changes, that is, by identifying the safety constraints that were violated at 
each level of the socio-technical control structure as well as why they were inadequate or, 
if they were potentially adequate, why the system was unable to exert appropriate control 
over their enforcement.  Thus, the most basic concept in the new model is not an event, 
but a constraint.   As an example, the unsafe behavior (hazard) in the Challenger loss was 
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the release of hot propellant gases from the field joint.  The miscreant O-ring was used to 
control the hazard, i.e., its role was to seal a tiny gap in the field joint created by pressure 
at ignition.  The design, in this case, did not effectively impose the required constraint on 
the propellant gas release.  Starting from here, there are then several questions that need 
to be answered to understand why the accident occurred.  Why was this particular design 
unsuccessful in imposing the constraint, why was it chosen (what was the decision 
process), why was the flaw not found during development, and was there a different 
design that might have been more successful.  These questions and others consider the 
original design process. 
 
It is also necessary to examine the contribution of the operations process.  One constraint 
that was violated during operations was the requirement to correctly handle feedback 
about any potential violation of the safety design constraints, in this case, feedback 
during operations that the control by the O-rings of the release of hot propellant gases 
from the field joints was not adequately enforced by the design.  There were several 
instances of feedback that was not adequately handled in this case, such as O-ring blowby 
and erosion during previous shuttle launches and feedback by engineers who were 
concerned about the behavior of the O-rings in cold weather.  In addition, there was 
missing feedback about changes in the design and testing procedures during operations, 
such as the use of a new type of putty and the introduction of new O-ring leak checks 
without adequate verification that they satisfied system safety constraints on the field 
joints.  As a final example, the control processes were flawed that ensured unresolved 
safety concerns were adequately considered before each flight, i.e., flight readiness 
reviews and other feedback channels to project management making flight decisions.   
 
A system in this new model is not a static design---it is a dynamic process that is 
continually adapting to achieve its goals and to react to changes in itself and in the 
environment.  The original design must not only enforce appropriate constraints on 
behavior to ensure safe operation, but the system must continue to operate safely as 
changes occur over time.  The process leading to an accident (loss event) is described in 
terms of an adaptive feedback function that fails to maintain safety as performance 
changes over time to meet a complex set of organizational and individual goals and 
values.  Preventing accidents is accomplished by ensuring that appropriate constraints are 
enforced, both in the system design and during operations and that the control structure 
(including the organizational culture and the management structure) enforces the 
appropriate set of goals and values.   
 
The use of such a model provides a theoretical foundation for the introduction of unique 
new types of accident analysis, hazard analysis and risk assessment techniques, 
approaches to designing performance monitoring and safety metrics, and accident 
prevention approaches at all levels of the socio-technical control structure from the 
highest government and legal system levels down through the organizational levels to the 
lowest level technical design and operations. 
 
STATUS:  Using basic accident and system theory, I have identified a set of general 
factors that can be used to explain and prevent accidents using this new model.  I've 
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experimentally applied the factors to understand several past accidents, including the 
Ariane 5 loss, a Titan/Centaur/Milstar loss, and the accidental shootdown of two U.S. 
Blackhawk helicopters by friendly fire in the Iraqi no-fly-zone, and compared the results 
with those obtained by the official accident investigation board in each of these cases.   
 
I am now starting to determine how the model and the identified general accident factors 
can be used to prevent accidents, not just explain those that have occurred, by using a 
model I created of the control software for an industrial robot.  The robot is designed to 
service the thermal tiles on the space shuttle between flights.  The result should be a new 
type of hazard analysis technique (very different from the traditional techniques such as 
fault tree analysis). This new hazard analysis technique can be partly automated, and 
automated assistance can be provided for the other parts that require human analysis.  
Finally, I have a Ph.D. student looking at the potential use of the model to define new 
types of risk assessment that work better for complex systems and include more factors 
than traditional Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA). I will be looking at how the results 
of the new hazard analysis technique can be used to identify important performance 
metrics that can identify a drift of the system and organization toward greater accident 
risk during use of the system (operations). 
 
All of this is part of a book I am writing that is about one third finished.  The completed 
parts include a description of the basic model and the analysis of the three accidents (to 
be finished in 2-3 weeks).  The new hazard analysis technique is in development and the 
new risk assessment approaches are farthest off.  The ESD symposium paper will 
describe the rationale for the model (why current models are not adequate), the new 
model, and the results of the evaluation using previous accidents (all of this is completed 
or very close to being complete).  At the end, the paper will outline implications for the 
use of the model including potential new hazard analysis and risk assessment techniques 
and use to generate safety performance metrics. 
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Complexity -- the State of the Art 
Seth Lloyd 
 
Abstract: This talk provides a review of work on the sciences of complexity.  Topics 
presented include complex adaptive systems, agent-based modeling, emergent behaviors, 
artificial life, genetic algorithms, cellular automata, econophysics, autocatalytic networks, 
origins of life, etc. Methods for the analysis and characterization of complexity will be 
presented with an emphasis on the successes, failures, and future prospects of these 
methods. The degree of overlap with engineering systems issues will be discussed.  
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\bigskip\noindent Hidden Order: How Adaptation Builds Complexity 
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\bigskip\noindent At Home in the Universe: The Search for the Laws of 
Self-Organization and Complexity 
 
\noindent by Stuart Kauffman, Oxford University Press, New York, Oxford,  
321 pages, \$25.00. 
 
\vskip 1cm 
 
Complexity is complex.  On this everyone agrees.  The Fibonacci sequence appears in a 
pattern of sunflower seeds; corporate hierarchies of who pays or obeys follow the same 
mathematical rules as ecological hierarchies of who eats or is eaten; human beings and 
pygmy chimpanzees have a hard time with their in-laws.  Complex systems share 
common patterns, as if an underlying order bound them together.  But whether this 
underlying order admits systematic study, or whether complexity arises from a lawless 
variety that tolerates few generalizations, is open to debate.  The four books reviewed 
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here describe attempts to study complexity systematically and scientifically.  Although 
they speak with different voices, the books' authors agree that the sciences of complexity 
are thriving.  Other voices (such as that of John Horgan in these pages) raise a different 
argument: the sciences of complexity are, if not bogus, devoid of concrete results.  Who 
is right? 
 
The Latin {\it complector, complexus} comes from the Greek 
$\pi\lambda\epsilon'\kappa\omega$, to plait or twine.  A complex system is woven out of 
many parts.  The sciences of complexity try to understand the patterns of the weave.  The 
orator Cicero used {\it complexus} to describe an intricate rhetorical argument, while the 
bawdy playwright Plautus preferred to use {\it complexus} to describe intertwined limbs 
in a sexual embrace.  To make sense of the current debate on complexity, Plautus's 
meaning is more helpful.   
 
The sciences of complexity promiscuously embrace almost every subject that calls itself 
science, and a few that do not.  A search of the MIT library data base reveals `complexity' 
in anthropology, biology, chemistry, computer science, cosmology, dentistry, design, 
economics, ethnography, functional analysis, geology, historical studies, housing, 
immunology, information theory, Islamic architecture, Japanese calligraphy, knapsack 
problems, linguistics, material science, mathematics, music, numismatics, operations 
research, philosophy, physics, portfolio management, quantum computers, radiology, 
statistics, telecommunications, theology, ultrathin films, urban planning, vibrational 
failure, water pollution, wavelets,  X-ray diffraction, ytterbium spectra, and zoology, to 
name but a few out of thousands of references.  It is just not possible for the same 
mathematical techniques to apply rigourously to all these subjects: in some fields 
`scientific' approaches to the study of complexity are indeed devoid of concrete results.  
Like Don Juan, the sciences of complexity sometimes simply strike out. 
 
In some fields, however, a systematic approach to studying complexity is not only 
successful, but is the only possible way to succeed.  Just what does a scientific study of 
complex systems have to offer?  Compared with conventional sciences, the sciences of 
complexity as detailed in the books under consideration emphasize distinctive methods 
and questions.  1) They focus on information: how do complex systems get information 
and what do they do with it?  2) They use detailed computer models for hypothesis 
testing and generation: how do computerized neurons behave when wired together in a 
chunk of artifical brain called a neural net?  When artificial stock brokers buy and sell 
artificial stocks does the resulting market exhibit booms and busts? 3) They emphasize 
emergent properties: how do the laws of chemistry arise from the laws of physics, or the 
laws of biology from the laws of chemistry?  In general, how do complex, specific laws 
arise from simple, generic ones?  The techniques developed for studying complex 
systems are useful at the boundaries between conventional fields, where well-understood 
laws like chemical laws give rise to well-documented phenomena like life in a way that 
no one fully understands.  Even when the parts of a system are perfectly understood, 
when woven together they can exhibit behavior that is too intricate and involved to be 
easily understood.  In such cases, often the only recourse is to create an information-
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based model for the system and simulate it on a computer.  For some fields, the 
systematic study of complexity is essential. 
 
The goals of the sciences of complexity are hardly new.  After all, Aristotle's {\it 
Physics} (from the Greek $\phi \upsilon\sigma\iota'\varsigma$, begetting or becoming) 
can be regarded as an abortive attempt to understand the laws of emergence.   
Montesquieu's {\it Spirit of the Laws} or Comte's {\it Positivism}, Poisson's probabilistic 
analyses of the fairness of trial by jury, as well as the sociological theorizing of Walras 
and Pareto, span two hundred years of attempts to create analogues of Newton's laws for 
complex social systems.  What is new?  The computer.  In the last fifty years, the 
exponentially increasing ability of machines to process information has allowed the 
exploration of realms of complexity that were previously inaccessible. 
 
Not that computers are so smart.  It's just that human beings are relatively dumb, at least 
when it comes to performing mind-numbingly repetitive mathematical manipulations.   In 
the past, to trace out the consequences of even the most over-simplified models for how 
proteins fold or how clouds form was virtually impossible.  Now, however, the economist 
need not assume that agents are omniscient, that markets clear instantaneously, or that 
money is the only thing that matters.  Though computerized models are still necessarily 
simplified, they can include much more detail than was previously possible.  
 
These four books are full of examples of subjects where the sciences of complexity work, 
and work well.  Trained as scientists, Peter Coveney and Roger Highfield demonstrated 
themselves to be a formidable writing duo with their previous book, {\it The Arrow of 
Time}.  Their current book, {\it Frontiers of Complexity}, provides a lucid account of 
lines of research in which an emphasis on information and computation has yielded 
surprising and fascinating results.  {\it Frontiers of Complexity} is a bestiary of complex 
systems, complete with color prints of artificial life forms.  Packed with information, 
including an extensive bibliography and glossary, the book begins by introducing the 
reader to Alan Turing and John von Neumann, who can be thought of as the father and 
mother of the the modern digital computer (Turing provided an abstract blueprint for a 
computer: von Neumann joined Turing's blueprint with his own basic ideas and then 
labored to bring some of the first computing machines into the world).  A section on the 
history of computation supplies the reader with a tool kit containing fundamental 
concepts of information and computation.  The tools in the kit are easily grasped, and 
allow the reader to handle the dizzying array of results on neural nets, chaos theory, 
origins of life, quantum computers, brain imaging, etc., that follow.  Each subject is 
clearly explained on its own, so that like any good bestiary, the book is perfect for 
browsing.  (The downside of having stand-alone sections is that a topic can be introduced 
on one page, then reintroduced several pages later as if it were being met with for the first 
time.)   
 
The book is particularly detailed on the subject of artificial life.  In the 1950's, von 
Neumann analyzed the problem of self-reproducing organisms in the abstract, by 
investigating computerized organisms, or automata, that were capable of creating copies 
of themselves.  He noted several features that a self-reproducing automaton must possess, 
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all of which turned out to be features of living cells once DNA was identified as the 
genetic material.  Contemporary offspring of von Neumann's idea exhibit a wide variety 
of `biological' behavior, including parasitism, immunity, and malignancy.  Anyone whose 
computer has been infected by a virus has had first hand experience of artificial disease 
and the difficulty of killing off an artificial life form. 
 
Although it surveys fewer subjects than {\it Frontiers of Complexity}, John Holland's {\it 
Hidden Order} provides a considerably deeper view into the possibility of automata 
behaving as if they were alive.  One of the pioneers of the sciences of complexity was the 
Polish mathematician Stanislaw Ulam.  Like von Neumann, Ulam contributed to many 
branches of mathematics, and invented the now ubiquitous Monte Carlo   technique for 
simulating the behavior of complex systems by using random numbers or throws of the 
dice.  Ulam collaborated with von Neumann in his artificial life project, and showed how 
automata could live out their artificial lives in an extended computerized world called a 
cellular automaton.  {\it Hidden Order} is based on the Ulam memorial lectures delivered 
by Holland at the Santa Fe Institute.   In it, Holland recapitulates some of his MacArthur 
award-winning work on genetic algorithms---computerized analogs of the processes of 
mutation and recombination that underlie biological evolution.  Holland shows how 
computers can learn to cope with complexity by imitating how living creatures cope with 
their complex environments.  He articulates clearly just how computer models can be 
used to study complex adaptive systems, and notes that mindless modeling accomplishes 
nothing unless it is supplemented with insight and reflection.\footnote{*}{Feynman 
noted that people who wish to analyse nature without using mathematics must settle for a 
reduced understanding: Holland introduces simple mathematical equations to illustrate 
his points.  For the reader who is reasonably comfortable with the math learned in fifth 
grade, the equations should prove no obstacle, and they greatly increase the 
understanding of how artificial organisms adapt or fail to adapt to their environment. } A 
considerable part of the book is devoted to the description of an ambitious and as yet 
incomplete artificial ecosystem called Echo; some reader may find more compelling the 
brief section on the artificial stock exchange, created by Holland with economist Brian 
Arthur and physicist Richard Palmer along lines suggested in discussions with the Nobel 
laureates Kenneth Arrow (economics) and Phil Anderson (physics).  In this electronic 
arena, mindless but greedy automata bid against eachother's strategies, producing 
speculative bubbles and crashes and other real-life phenomena that classical economics 
with its perfect markets has difficulty reproducing. 
 
As the list of contributors to the artificial stock exchange indicates, the study of complex 
systems is fundamentally an interdisciplinary excercise: the underlying order in ecology 
can be compared with that in economics only by people who understand both.  But 
research that weaves together ideas from many fields to try to solve a problem in a 
particular field is likely to face opposition from the workers in that field.  The logic of 
academic turf battles demands that interlopers be challenged, just as do the logics of 
military battles, of challenges to the dominance hierarchy in primate groups, of 
presidential primaries, and of bacterial infections.   Interdisciplinary work can be labelled 
`bogus' because it is wrong, or because it fails to address the prevailing dogma.  
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Life is by definition the provenance of biologists, who have painstakingly elucidated 
many of the chemical processes that underlie life as we know it.  But life as we know it 
evolved from earlier life forms we don't know as much about.  When it comes to the 
chemical processes that resulted in the first life on earth more than three million years 
ago (discounting for the moment the speculative theory that life was `seeded' from 
space), virtually nothing is known.   Computer-based simulations of chemical reactions 
from which life might have arisen are currently being carried out by theoretical 
biologists, who are regarded with suspicion by some of their colleagues. 
 
Stuart Kauffman, M.D. and MacArthur fellow, has been one of the most productive of 
theoretical biologists.   He has followed up his more technical {\it The Origins of Order} 
with {\it At Home in the Universe}, an account of how life might have arisen from non-
life and how complex order might have arisen not from chaos, but from the edge of 
chaos. At the conceptual center of {\it At Home in the Universe} lie Kauffman's simple 
and suggestive models.  Particularly relevant to the origins of life is the notion of an 
`autocatalytic set,' an idea suggested by Melvin Calvin and explored independently by 
Otto R\"ossler, by Manfred Eigen, and by Kauffman.  An autocatalytic set arises when a 
group of chemicals react with eachother to produce other chemicals that in turn 
encourage or catalyze the original reactions.  Starting at almost negligible concentrations 
in a given volume, such a set of chemicals and reactions can by mutual catalytic 
encouragement rapidly come to dominate the volume.  The set effectively reproduces 
itself and can evolve if it discovers new reactions and creates new products.  Eventually, 
the story goes, the evolving set hits upon the chemical reactions that make up life. 
 
This is potentially a convincing story, and lacks only a detailed analysis of the chemical 
kinetics to be confirmed not just as good science but as superb science (Eigen received a 
Nobel Prize in part for his work on hypercycles, autocatalytic sets involving RNA).  
Doyne Farmer, Norman Packard and Richard Bagley managed to program a Los Alamos 
computer with a simplified, artificial chemistry that exhibited autocatalytic sets; 
unfortunately, the actual chemical kinetics are too complicated to be analyzed even by the 
fastest computer available.  If it is to be confirmed, the autocatalyic set hypothesis for the 
origins of life will have to await more powerful computers and more detailed chemical 
experiments. 
 
The explanations of Kauffman's scientific work are concise and convincing.  The prose 
that surrounds the explanations is less so.  The chapter on autocatalytic sets, entitled `We 
the Expected,' begins with the sentence, `What raw day first saw life, raw life itself, 
pregnant with the future?'  Even if autocatalytic sets turn out to be the correct model for 
the origins of life, they shouldn't be expected to answer such questions.  Like Anglo-
Saxon epic poets, Kauffman is fond of alliteration and internal rhyme: `Physics, cold in 
its calculus,'  `coyote crafty across the ridgetop,' or `the fleeter-flying fly decreases the 
fitness of the frog.'  Some may enjoy this wordplay, others may think of Beowulf on bad 
acid.  Whoever reads {\it At Home in the Universe} for its account of Kauffman's 
insightful models of adaptation and self-organization will find that the scientific results 
speak for themselves. 
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The most remarkable and eloquent of these four books on the sciences of complexity is 
the only one not written by a scientist.  George Johnson's {\it Fire in the Mind} examines 
not only How people search for order, but Why.  No scientist could have written this 
insightful study.  Scientists are usually too consumed with their own search for order to 
step back and ask, Why search?  As to How, scientists answer with one voice: by 
Science!  Scientists are people with an unquestioned faith in questioning everything.  But 
this faith in reason and experiment is as important for science as faith in God is for 
religion.  Both based on faith, science and religion ask many of the same questions.  {\it 
Fire in the Mind} compares point by point the stories that science and religion tell of how 
the world began, what it is made of, where life came from, and what the future holds. 
 
Taking the landscape of northern New Mexico as backdrop, Johnson fills his stage with 
scientists from the Santa Fe Institute, Indians from San Ildefonso pueblo, bomb makers 
from Los Alamos, and flagellants from the Catholic sect of Penitentes, and lets them 
speak.  Of these, only the first group is not bound by vows of secrecy, and so says the 
most.  Johnson's account of subjects such as artificial life and autocatalytic sets is the 
most incisive and readable of those in the books reviewed here.  In addition, his taste for 
the mysterious has lead him to two quiet scientific success stories not reported in the 
books above: in the last two decades, scientists such as Charles Bennett at IBM, 
Wojciech Zurek at Los Alamos, and Carlton Caves at the University of New Mexico 
have revealed the pattern in which information is woven together with entropy in 
thermodynamics; over the same period, a number of scientists including Zurek and 
Murray Gell-Mann, Nobel laureate in Physics, have made great progress in showing how 
the concrete classical world we see around us is braided out of insubstantial quantum 
events.  (Gell-Mann's intellectual autobiography {\it The Quark and the Jaguar} contains 
an engaging and incisive discussion of the sciences of complexity.) Like a magician 
conducting a master class, Johnson regales us with strange phenomena, then reveals them 
to be completely explicable.  
 
His years as a science reporter for the New York Times have made him adept at succint 
explanation.  But Johnson's desire not only to explain, but to understand the urge to 
explain, provides {\it Fire in the Mind} with its own fire.  The book is at its most original 
and revealing where it discusses the social functions of knowledge and understanding.  
Johnson examines the ways in which three cultures, Indian, Spanish, and Anglo, overlap 
to shape northern New Mexican life,\footnote{*}{Anglo, short for anglo-saxon, means 
here neither Indian nor Spanish: to be Jewish in Santa Fe is still to be an Anglo.} and 
explores at length the problems faced by communities and by individuals who wish to 
preserve traditional knowledge that conflicts with contemporary culture or with scientific 
knowledge.  In the end, the dominance of scientific knowledge, like that of pop culture, 
comes primarily from its drive to make itself accessible to everyone. 
 
Scientific results are exactly those that can be reproduced in principle by anyone (or at 
any rate, anyone with a grant from the NIH).  Science is by nature public.  In the past 
decade, most major newspapers throughout the world have begun to publish weekly 
science sections.   The books reviewed here owe their lush production values and large 
press runs, if not their very existence, to the well-deserved popularity of books such as 
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James Gleick's {\it Chaos} and Stephen Hawking's {\it A Brief History of Time}.  
Apparently, people are interested in science and want to understand how it effects their 
lives.  In this atmosphere there is a tendency to hype science.  Much of the current debate 
over the sciences of complexity examines whether ideas such as `the edge of chaos,' and 
`self-organized criticality' have been oversold.  If they have been, we soon will know.  
Even if those particular ideas turn out to be bogus, these four books will still be read: 
after all, no bestiary would be complete without a unicorn. 
 
In fact, while the debate continues, the sciences of complexity have quietly pervaded 
everyday science and engineering.  Almost a decade ago, having just received my Ph.D., 
I attended the first Santa Fe Institute summer school for the study of complex systems.  
There I learned about many of the techniques described in these books, such as genetic 
algorithms, cellular automata, and simulated annealing.  At the time, those techniques 
seemed to me far out, abstract, and not necessarily practical.  Now I am a professor in the 
department of Mechanical Engineering at MIT.  While I write this, graduate students are 
applying genetic algorithms to find the least wasteful way to stamp parts out of sheet 
metal, programming cellular automata to analyze air conditioning, and using simulated 
annealing to optimize designs for engines.   Ideas from the theory of information and 
computation are woven together in a method called Axiomatic Design, and put to work 
making better freezers and injection molds.  A good working definition of a complex 
system is one that has to get and process large amounts of information in order to 
function.  Cells, brains and ecosystems are not alone in their complexity: increasingly, 
they are being joined by buildings, cars, and washing machines.  The systematic study of 
complex systems is here to stay. 
 
Not that there was ever any doubt about its staying power. All of the goals, and most of 
the basic ideas of the sciences of complexity have been around for as long as science 
itself.  Anyone who regards artificial life composed of self-reproducing automata as a 
futuristic idea should read the second sentence of Hobbes's {\it Leviathin} (1651): `For 
seeing life is but a motion of limbs, the beginning whereof is some principal part within; 
why may we not say, that all {\it automata} (engines that move themselves by springs 
and wheels as doth a watch) have an artificial life?'  Indeed, why not?    
 
One of the first and best books on the sciences of complexity is {\it The Dreams of 
Reason,} by Heinz Pagels.  Published in 1988, not long before Pagels' tragic death in a 
climbing accident, {\it The Dreams of Reason} explores the role of reason in the 
irrational human need to understand.  Noting that this irrational urge has historically co-
opted all available rational tools, Pagels argues that the future of science lies in the 
synthesis provided by information and computation.  Tall, flamboyant, and fond of a 
good intellectual dust-up, Pagels was the real-life model for the chaotician Malcolm in 
{\it Jurassic Park}.  Unlike Malcolm, he can't be resurrected for a sequel, but if he could 
read these books and their reports on what the study of complex systems has 
accomplished recently, he'd probably smile, and he'd certainly say, `I told you so.'   
 
\vfill\eject\end 
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Complexity is often confused with chaos.   Murray Gell-Mann, author of {\it The Quark 
and the Jaguar}, a book that contains an engaging and penetrating discussion of the 
sciences of complexity, claims never to have given a talk on complex systems without 
someone coming up afterward to thank him for his talk on chaos theory.  In fact, chaos is 
only one of the sciences of complexity.  For all its ominous name and the hoopla 
surrounding its popularization, chaos is a relatively narrow mathematical discipline that 
concentrates on classical, deterministic, dynamical systems; and the scientific successes 
of chaos theory come from the intensity of its narrow focus. 
 
\vfill\eject\end 
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Bits and Bucks: Modeling Complex Systems by Information Flow 
Seth Lloyd, MIT; Thomas Lloyd, McKinsey 
 
Extended Abstract:  
 
This paper presents a general method for modeling and characterizing complex systems 
in terms of flows of information together with flows of conserved or quasi-conserved 
quantities such as energy or money.  Using mathematical techniques borrowed from 
statistical mechanics and from physics of computation, a framework is constructed that 
allows general systems to be modeled in terms of how information, energy, money, etc. 
flow between subsystems.  Physical, chemical, biological, engineering, and commercial 
systems can all be analyzed within this framework.   
 
Take, for example, trading over the internet. Each flow of information (measured in bits 
per second) is associated with a flow of energy (measured in watts).  The energy per bit -- 
effectively, a form of temperature -- is a crucial quantity in characterizing the 
communications performance of the network in the presence of noise and loss.  But each 
bit can also be associated with a monetary value (bucks), as when the title to some 
commodity is transferred electronically to a buyer and an electronic draft to pay for the 
commodity is transferred to the seller.  The bucks per bit -- again, a form of temperature -
-  is a crucial quantity in deciding whether to buy or sell.  Clearly, some bits are worth 
more than others!   
 
This paper shows that in complex systems that can be accurately described by such a 
modeling framework, different structures for interconnects and protocols for exchange 
can lead to qualitative and quantitative differences in behavior.  In some cases, such as 
thermodynamic systems, stable behavioral equilibria exist and exhibit gaussian 
fluctuations.  In other cases, such as phase transitions and systems of economic exchange, 
quasi-stable or unstable equilibria exist and exhibit power-law fluctuations.  Finally, 
some types of flows yield no equilibrium at all.  The framework makes quantitative 
predictions for the efficacy, flexibility, stability, and robustness of complex systems 
characterized by flows of information together with energy, money, etc. 
 
To quantify and relate flows of information and energy/money, model the system to be 
analyzed as a directed graph.   Each vertex of the graph corresponds to a subsystem at a 
particular point in time, so that the graph represents a `space-time' picture of the complex 
system.  Each directed edge represents a path along which information and energy/money 
can flow. To preserve our ordinary notions of causality, flows are directed from past to 
future.  The graphs are acyclic (no time travel).  The requirement that different quantities 
such as energy and money are conserved leads to constraints on the flows: the total 
amount of a quantity flowing into a vertex is equal to the total amount flowing out. 
 
Flows are inherently dynamical.  To specify the dynamics of the model in the most 
general way possible that respects the causal structure, consider a Markovian dynamics in 
which the probabilities that a system is in a particular state at a particular time are 
functions of the states of its inputs.  A directed graph associated with a Markovian 
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dynamics of this sort is called a Bayesian network.  The probabilistic dynamics together 
with the conservation laws causes the conserved quantities to diffuse throughout the 
network according to a well-specified dynamics, a potentially complex diffusion 
equation. 
 
The Markovian dynamics allows one to assign a joint probability distribution to the states 
of all the vertices and edges.  Consequently, each vertex and edge also has a well defined 
quantity of information associated with it.   Similarly, mutual and conditional 
informations are well-defined.  That is, the Markovian dynamics allows one to quantify 
the amounts of information flowing through the graph. 
 
This framework is potentially very powerful: it can represent the probabilistic dynamics 
of essentially any physical system (discretized in space and time).  For example, the 
action of a digital computer can readily be mapped onto this framework, where the 
vertices represent logic gates, the edges represent wires, and the graph as a whole 
represents the wiring diagram for the computation.   So this framework can clearly 
represent any process that can be simulated on a digital computer.  Indeed, if the nodes 
represent quantum logic gates, and conditional probabilities are replaced by conditional 
probability amplitudes, the framework can be used to represent any computable quantum 
system, including a quantum computer.  Since quantum computers can simulate all 
known quantum systems to an arbitrary degree of accuracy, this framework is capable of 
representing an arbitrary physical dynamics. 
 
This paper will focus on the application of the bits/bucks framework to engineered and 
financial systems.  The usefulness of the framework for any given system will depend on 
the ease with which the system's operation can be mapped onto the framework, and on 
the complexity of computing the dynamics of the resulting model.  We will investigate 
the application of the framework to physical systems such as fluid flows, to complex 
engineered systems such as automobiles, and to financial systems such as a commodities 
exchange. 
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An Attempt at Complex System Classification 
C. L. Magee and O. L. de Weck 
 
Summary 
The remainder of this paper is organized as we currently intend to organize the final 
paper.  However, the content is not a shortened version of the final paper but instead a 
status report on the development of the content. 
 
Introduction 
 There are three inter-related reasons for attempting a system classification study 
at this time. By analogy with other fields, a classification framework has often been a 
major step forward and a significant accelerator of development of the field. Thus our 
first reason for undertaking this work is as a possible small “foundation” contribution in 
the field.  For definitions, we rely on previous work by the ESD committee. 
 A second related purpose is that by developing a framework for classification of 
complex systems, we may help delineate the “intellectual boundaries” of  engineering 
systems.  Such delineation may be of interest within MIT in differentiating ESD from 
engineering departments, the Sloan School and other areas as well as outside MIT in the 
broader academic setting. We presume that such boundaries will be open and blurred as 
are those defining other fields. 
 The third and to us most important reason for attempting to classify complex 
systems at this time is to make a contribution to the engineering/design of such systems. 
As the modern world relentlessly evolves towards a highly interactive and interdependent 
complex set of complex systems, the improvement of our ability to conceive, design, 
implement and operate such systems is becoming among mankind’s highest needs. 
Perhaps the major design question revolves around the issue of designing for future 
design and use flexibility (reuse architecture). 
 
Approach 
 Our approach has been to assess the utility of prior classification frameworks and 
then to extend them and develop new ones by both top-down and bottom-up techniques. 
In order to assess the utility of a framework, we are focusing on a “testbed” list of 
complex engineering systems. We are updating the list based on feedback from other 
ESD faculty but results at this point relate to the original list only. We intend to go 
through another round of dialogue with the ESD faculty before finalizing the list.  
 In addition to the list we have developed a set of criteria for determining whether 
a given classification framework is useful.  The first criterion is that it must work for the 
systems we are trying to engineer more effectively (hence the list as “testbed”). To have 
utility, a framework must first and foremost be able to differentiate among systems on 
our list based on some system attributes and separate them into distinct groupings. In 
addition, valuable classification schemes would help by defining categories where 
different engineering methods and approaches are most useful. A useful framework 
would also possibly help define potential issues and solutions in various categories 
suggested by the framework. Finally, a useful scheme might suggest the most viable 
modeling and representation techniques to apply in different categories. 
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 Using these criteria and the preliminary “testbed”, we first assess prior 
classification frameworks for complex systems (next section). In the final two sections 
we briefly discuss our status on our top-down and bottom-up approaches to developing 
new classification frameworks. 
 
Existing Classification of Complex Systems 
 Three existing classification frameworks have been examined and tested with our 
preliminary list of complex systems of interest. The first of these is due to Bartalanffy 
who extended Boulding’s work.  These frameworks were suggested as part of their 
efforts on “General System Theories” in the 1950’s. The list as presented by Bartalanffy 
had a strong orientation towards his discipline of biology and is summarized in Table 1. 
 
 Table 1  Systems classification according to Bartalanffy 
     
   Static Structures 
   Clock Works 
   Control Mechanisms 
   Open Systems 
   Lower Organisms 
   Animals 
   Man 
   Socio-cultural Systems 
   Symbolic Systems 
 
 
In this list each successive item is meant to be more complex and to some degree to 
incorporate the preceding entries. In addition, Bartanlaffy suggests the “theories and 
models” useful in each level of the hierarchy. Although this is the kind of utility we 
would like, this framework fails our first criterion as it does not apparently differentiate 
among our systems of interest. All of the “testbed systems” are similar combinations of 
the last three levels in this hierarchy. 
 A second approach from within the European Systems Engineering tradition is 
due to V. Hubka in his book-“The Theory of Technical Systems”. His framework also 
separates technical and human systems and further delineates the technical systems 
according to academic disciplines. Again this framework fails our first criterion as it does 
not differentiate among our systems of interest-all are at his highest category. 
 A third classification framework is also from the European Systems interest and is 
of recent development by Buechel et. al.  This is based on system attributes as shown in 
Table 2 below. 
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 Table 2: System Classification according to A. Buechel et al. (modified) 
 
System Attributes 
Attribute Value 
realm of existence real virtual 
origin natural artificial 
boundary open closed 
time dependence static = time invariant dynamic = time varying 
system states continuous discrete hybrid 
predictability of 
system behavior 
deterministic stochastic indeterminate chaotic 
degree of system 
complexity 
simple moderately 
complex 
highly 
complex 
extremely 
complex 
system control open loop  feedforward  feedback control 
human  
involvement 
human operated semi-autonomous fully autonomous 
System size small medium large 
 
 
Our systems of interest are all real, artificial (with possible natural sub-systems or natural 
systems interacting outside the system boundary), open, dynamic, large, highly to 
extremely complex (by some definitions) and have human involvement.  Nonetheless, it 
may be possible to use the predictability and system control attributes to obtain some 
differentiation among the systems in our list. The system classification aspects related to 
their control and flow of information within the systems suggests a link to the cybernetics 
literature. Thus, we are still pursuing this framework but at present expect only limited 
utility of this approach with our systems .We are also examining other ideas such as 
“system archetypes” from the Systems Dynamics Literature as to their value in a 
classification framework. 
 
New Classification Frameworks 
 In order to develop new classification approaches that may be more useful, we are 
simultaneously pursuing top-down and bottom-up quantitative perspectives. It has been a 
major premise of our work that the classification framework will have to involve more 
quantification in order to be highly useful. The need to do this is empirically apparent 
when one attempts to differentiate among our systems of interest with prior classification 
frameworks (see preceding section). 
 
Bottom-up Approach 
  This is basically an “experimental” approach, which examines various 
quantitative attributes of existing systems (the “testbed”).  The hypothesis is that 
comparison of the appropriate quantitative attributes across a range of systems will define 
or lead to new classification frameworks. Ashby has made multiple plots of application 
properties of existing materials of all kinds and many of these “naturally” separate well-
known categories of materials such as ceramics, polymers, metals etc. into different 
sections of the complex plots. A hypothesis we are testing is that similar plots of the 
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appropriate attributes of engineering systems of interest will lead to clusters of 
significantly different engineering systems. A second working hypothesis is that the 
attributes we use to characterize the systems are the key to determining the value of any 
classification framework we propose. 
  
Our experimental approach to finding the appropriate attributes is to 
iterate among attributes depending on the utility found with the preceding trial. Thus, 
using the testbed we are attempting to devise and use a robust set of attributes to 
maximize the utility of the resulting classification framework. The attributes to be studied 
include: 
SYSTEM STATIC QUANTITATIVE ATTRIBUTES: mass, energy, 
information, cost/dollars to develop and build, people (manhours to build, R&D hours to 
develop, manual vs. knowledge content), volume occupied, interface length or area. 
DYNAMIC QUANTITATIVE ATTRIBUTES: mass flow, energy flow, 
information flow, value added (dollars) per day, manhours worked (manual, intellectual 
etc.). 
VARIATION: Quantification of stochastic variability of the static and 
dynamic variables is difficult but probably very important for achieving a useful 
classification framework. E.g. assess rate of change or substitution of system elements. 
SYSTEM STRUCTURE: This is another important but difficult to 
measure aspect of complex systems. It is difficult to measure because quantification of 
this attribute is unknown to the authors but notions of DSM density may be developed to 
quantify internal or external interactions which are a key element in structure. 
SYSTEM FUNCTIONS: The basic functional purposes of our systems are 
being examined to see if these help achieve a useful classification framework. 
SYSTEM ATTRIBUTES RATIOS: These may prove the best way to 
achieve classification results of high utility. Example ratios include $/lb., R&D$/joule, 
manhours/lb., manual manhours/information manhours, interface area/volume, etc. 
 
Top-down approach 
This work essentially involves review of the literature for complex 
systems theories.  The purpose of our review is to find classification schemes or 
parameters of importance that may become attributes for our experimental or bottom-up 
approach (if successful this might represent a “middle-out” approach). 
 The theoretical frameworks of importance in the General Systems era 
included cybernetics and information theory and some aspects of these may contribute in 
our current efforts.  The more recent attention to complex system theories has been 
considerable. This “modern” complexity theory is described by some as having roots in 
economics, evolutionary biology and statistical physics. Some of these models have been 
compared to quantitative aspects of complex systems but these are still rare and to our 
current knowledge not for the kinds of systems on our list. We plan to use these theories 
to the extent possible to guide us in attribute selection for our bottom-up studies. 
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Concluding Remark 
 
The major challenge over the next few months will be obtaining sufficient 
quantitative data about systems of interest to make meaningful progress in the 
experimental approach at the heart of our paper. We believe by being flexible about the 
possible parameters/attributes being studied we maximize our chances of having enough 
data to test the ideas and perhaps develop something of real interest.  We are trying to 
enlist UROP students (and any others ) in helping gather, plot and interpret data. 
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The Evolving Role of Systems Methodology For Seeking Pathways to the 
Future In Large Scale Open Systems 
 
David H. Marks 
Goulder Family Professor of Engineering Systems 
And Civil and Environmental Engineering 
Director, MIT Laboratory for Energy and the Environment 
 
 Based on thirty-plus years experience in exploring future scenarios for large-scale 
energy, environmental and resource systems, this paper offers an appraisal of where such 
activities are and where they are going.  There are two ways of addressing this.  Process:  
How are such exercises carried out, and Methods: Are new methodological advances 
emerging and how will they change the business of looking for pathways to the future.  
New advances in information technologies and computation, deeper thought about the 
metrics for measuring system performance (the “ilities”), and better systems methods in 
simulation and dealing with uncertainty and consumer psychology will make this process 
more productive and more insightful.   How soon will we be able to combine analyses of 
technologic alternatives along with a better understanding of institutional structures, 
regulations, business strategic planning and economic incentives in detailed simulations?  
From a process point of view, an evolving philosophy of  “no optimal path”, stakeholder 
involvement, transparency of assumptions,  data mining and wide ranging analysis of 
many different scenarios form a more enlightened framework for employing these new 
tools.  
 
 Consider two motivating examples for pathways to the future for energy choices 
in the 21st century.  One is a long-term Fossil Fuel-based scenario - in which our 
concerns about global warming and the environmental impacts of use are not strong 
enough to change quickly from a fossil fuel pathway.  In this scenario, fossil fuels 
perhaps aided by Nuclear Energy, will be kept vibrant by advances in production, 
transmission, and use, which will allow us to be more energy efficient and reduce 
environmental impacts.  In the second scenario, Decentralized Energy – in which global 
warming issues do become important – we will see a movement towards an electricity-
based and/or hydrogen-based largely decentralized energy carrier system.  Here energy 
production would depend more on renewables or hydrogen manufactured in distributed 
place, rather than in large complex central facilities, and a replacement of mobility of 
people by information technologies in a great many cases. More intelligent use would be 
the hallmarks of both approaches.   
 
 In the aftermath of September 11, as security of fossil fuel availability becomes 
more questionable; we see a merging of these two streams of thought towards a much 
more decentralized production of energy for stationary and mobile needs even before 
fossil fuel sources are stressed.  To quote “Just as the stone age did not end for lack of 
stones, the oil age will not end for lack of oil”. 
 
 At the heart of the analysis of this transition are complex system models, which 
can help to evaluate strategies for the operation and location of small almost self-
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generating power, mobility systems, employment, education, and health care delivery.  
These are, at their core, socially-driven technical systems with strong inputs from public 
decision-making, as well as private strategy.  The interplay between public policy designs 
and the instruments to implement them, and proactive and reactive private response, will 
be better understood by systems-based methodological advances and their 
implementation in new methodological frameworks. 
 
Research on Frameworks - the Process Issues 
 
1. The past is prologue to the future:  As we look to future problems, it is necessary 
to characterize the current state of affairs and the trends and actions that put us 
here.   This is a non-trivial exercise, which involves extensive data collection.  It 
is the place 
Where stakeholder alliances are forged and rules of engagement set for a 
successful process. 
2. The metrics for evaluation of the present and the future must be thought out 
carefully- Some recent experiences with such “ilities “ as sustainability are 
discussed.  An important issue is how uncertainty is dealt with.  
3. What are the Pathways to the Future?   In the words of Greg McRae “at least get 
the sign right”.  As engineers in large-scale open-systems become more 
conversant with economics and social sciences, the subtle issues of quantification 
vs. non-quantification will be addressed and simulation across a wide breath of 
supply alternatives and demand responses will become far more commonplace.  
4. The framework for evaluation of results, stakeholders’ display of assumptions and 
information will become a main stock in trade for engineering systems 
practitioners. 
 
 
Research on methods 
 
1. Life Cycle Tools 
 
A closer attention to extended life cycle analysis to understand and weigh impacts 
on economic, social and environmental goals of products and processes.  Exciting 
new work using the internet to limit time-consuming data gathering will lead to 
faster and better prototyping and the search for more innovative uses of materials 
and energy. 
 
 
2. Complex Simulation Under Uncertainty 
 
A new generation of stochastic tools capable of exploring risk vs. efficiency 
tradeoffs in large-scale quasi-public systems (water, energy, etc.) is now evolving.  
A rebirth of interest in Systems Dynamics and other simulation tools combined 
with economic and decision analysis tools, are forming a whole new way of 
looking at options.  In these large quasi-public systems, issues such as redundancy 
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and resilient protection from extreme events vs. “efficient systems” and their 
impacts on economic and social goals will need to be studied. 
 
 
3. Decentralized Systems Management Tools 
 
Strategies for the decentralized operational management of complex systems from 
traffic - to home energy use - will be developed depending heavily on information 
technologies. 
 
 
4. Focus on the Behavioral 
 
Understanding of end-use demands and consumer preference and the impacts 
economic and other regulatory instruments on them will become a more central 
theme. This requires a movement from the more traditional concept of building to 
meet externally- specified demands (a supply philosophy) - to a greater 
consideration of how demand modifications in types, locations, and timing of use 
can be integrated into decision-making (supply demand interaction).  Much closer 
alliances with the social science outside of economics and political science will be 
needed. 
 
 
5. Tools for Stakeholder Involvement 
 
As these systems have stakeholders outside of industry and government, tools for 
educating and building consensus about difficult tradeoffs will evolve much more 
quickly. Here visualization and tools for exploring complex tradeoffs between 
important economic environmental and social goals will be a central theme. 
 
 In an increasingly urbanized and increasingly populated world, how will societies 
deal with basic concerns for security, education, clean water and air, mobility, 
employment, and other components of an adequate quality of life?  The 33 percent 
increase in world population projected in the next 30 years will occur largely in rapidly 
urbanizing developing world countries. Only by viewing the sustainability of future 
settlements as complex systems can these basic tools need be met.  Key elements will be 
new institutions, and a greater emphasis on technical systems powered by information 
technologies.  Systems methods will be at the heart of tools needed for decision-making 
about future trajectories. 
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Three Regimes of Systems: Historical Perspectives on Systems Thinking in 
Engineering 
David A. Mindell 
 
This paper surveys the history of systems thinking in engineering in the United 
States, from the late nineteenth century to the present day. The history can be divided into 
three phases. In each phase, engineers concentrated on certain kinds of technical systems, 
and developed types of systems thinking to deal with them. First, from the late nineteenth 
century to World War II, systems thinking concentrated in the electric power and 
telephone industries and focused on interconnecting disparate elements into larger 
wholes, frequently for systems spread over large geographic areas. Second, the 
imperatives of World War II led engineers to conceptualize systems as integrated, 
dynamic entities, and to formalize methodologies for managing the complex 
organizations to design and operate such systems. This phase flourished in the Cold War, 
although its techniques are still with us today in selected areas. The third phase, what we 
call Engineering Systems, began to emerge in the 1990s when engineers began to expand 
the boundaries of technical systems to include not only their internal or organizational 
dynamics, but also broader social and industrial contexts. They also recognize that the 
complexity of these systems means that accurate prediction or even simulation is not 
always possible.  
At the turn of the 20th Century, two new systems dominated the technological 
landscape: electric power and the telephone network. Thomas Edison designed not only 
light bulbs, but a system that also included generators and  transmission lines to compete 
with gas lighting. By the 1920s, engineers conceptualized electric power systems as sets 
of interconnected elements like generators, motors, traction loads, or transmission lines 
each of which could be designed and analyzed independently. In the 1920s, as local or 
regional power networks connected into national “grids” or “superpower” systems, the 
new entities began to exhibit new behaviors that could only be understood by looking at 
the system as a whole. Still, within this engineering culture engineers tended not to use 
self-conscious language of “systems” to describe their work, although managers did 
increasingly see the system as including both physical power networks and the 
organizations that supported them. 
 In the telephone network, by contrast, the language of systems was more explicit. 
AT&T chief Theodore Vail’s famous motto “One policy, one system, universal service,” 
captured the company’s totalizing view, though its network was composed of vast 
numbers of small, interconnected units. Within AT&T, engineers referred to their 
national network as “the System,” and beginning in the 1920s the company had job titles 
for “System Engineers” and “Systems Development” departments. Yet these engineers 
did not have the most abstract view of the system, but rather concentrated on its concrete 
manifestations: the equipment layouts, power systems, and wiring diagrams for local 
substations. When Bell Telephone Laboratories was founded in 1925, engineers did begin 
to study the abstractions of the system like the statistics of switching, and the 
interchangeability of bandwidth, but systems were still understood as hierarchical 
assemblies of component parts, with unidirectional, linear interactions.   
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 The second phase of systems thinking began to emerge During World War II. In 
response to technical problems like radar and automatic gunfire control, engineers now 
conceptualized their systems as dynamic, integrated entities with feedbacks, where the 
behavior of each part helped determine the behavior of the whole. New techniques arose 
from the merger of servomechanism theory, communications theory, and feedback 
control. The term “system engineering” emerged to capture the sense that the products of 
advanced engineering, particularly in the military realm, could no longer be considered as 
individual machines or things but as systems: an aircraft was no longer simply a machine, 
but a collection of systems, for engines, fuel flow, structure, controls, etc.   
 Technical and organizational currents in the second phase of systems coalesced 
during the Cold War. For the Atlas project to build the first ICBM, the prime contractor 
was no longer an airframe manufacturer but rather a system engineering corporation, in 
this case Thompson-Ramo Woolridge (TRW). A similar set of systems oriented 
companies appeared, frequently in new organizational forms like RAND and MITRE. 
During the 1950s, a host of new disciplines appeared that we might call the systems 
sciences, including cybernetics, operations research, general systems theory, systems 
analysis, and systems dynamics – each had its own techniques, its own home institutions 
and its dominant professions. All viewed the world in terms of flows, feedbacks, and 
interactions, and analyzed systems by breaking them down into component parts, 
understanding the characteristics of those parts, and then recombining them. These 
approaches were considered “engineering science,” wherein expert analysis brought 
objective, quantitative analysis to complex problems, from nuclear targeting to the 
economics of innovation. They were characterized by the belief that experts, computers, 
and numbers could overcome politics and personal influence, which were considered 
irrational.   
The Cold War systems sciences achieved great success, particularly in areas with 
clearly defined technical goals, like the Apollo project -- explicitly modeled on the Atlas 
program and hailed as a triumph of systems engineering. The systems sciences also 
overreached, however, and met their limits in Vietnam, the Great Society programs, and 
other civil systems with complex interactions, heavy political components, and and 
vaguely defined boundaries.  
 In the last decades of the twentieth century, the third phase of systems thinking, 
which now goes under the rubric “engineering systems,” subtly began to emerge. 
Engineers recognized that technological systems exhibit complex behaviors that are 
rational, but not entirely predicable.  As Thomas Hughes argues, late-century engineering 
projects like the Central Artery and Tunnel in Boston began to treat the “messy 
complexity” of politics, social movements, and local interests not as external influences 
to be factored out, but as internal variables. The internet made it clear that distributed, 
unplanned systems could grow to be incredibly complex and powerful. Engineers 
increasingly turned their attention to large (sometimes global-scale) systems that exhibit 
complex behavior. At the same time, computer and simulation technologies advanced to 
the point where systems as complex as the global climate could be modeled with some 
degree of confidence, and used as a basis for making policy. Joe Sussman describes this 
era with the term CLIOS (Complex, Large, Interconnected, Open Systems) that explicitly 
include social, political, and economic variables in their models and definitions, and other 
new formulations are emerging as well.  
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These three phases do not constitute a linear progression; rather today’s systems 
landscape has elements from each phase, and each generation incorporates and furthers 
the ideas of the former. Still, the historical schema of three phases clarifies the issues at 
stake in defining Engineering Systems today and places it in historical perspective. 
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Large Scale Infrastructure Systems 
Fred Moavenzadeh 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
Large-scale infrastructure systems are at the nexus of three systems; social systems; 
natural systems and technological systems.  The social system generates demand for 
services of the systems, establishes the regulatory framework for their realization, 
operation and abandonment, and provides the economic systems whereby necessary 
resources (capital and labor) can be mobilized for their operation.   
 
The natural systems, used to be considered a barrier that challenged our ingenuity to 
overcome.  However, in the past few decades it has become a concern on how to protect 
it.    Large infrastructure systems have impacts on both the ability of the natural system to 
supply the resources needed to build and operate them, as well as the ability of the nature 
to absorb the waste that infrastructures generate.  This concern over “the source and the 
sink” ability of the nature has imposed new constraints on infrastructure with a very far 
reaching implications to planning design, construction, and operation and management of 
all kinds of infrastructure. 
 
The technological systems are basically the enabling means to create facilities that will 
meet the society’s need without straining our natural systems.  Several examples from 
hardware and software sides of technology will be used to demonstrate their enabling 
capacity.   
 
There are generally two types of large scale infrastructure systems: first type consists of 
very large, complex and, costly systems that require all components to be in place before 
the system can be operational.  Examples are power plants, petrochemical plants, 
skyscrapers, and environmental remediation facilities.  The second type of large scale 
infrastructure systems is composed of many parts, each by itself a functioning element 
and each requiring a small to medium size budget.  As long as the parts are 
geographically dispersed, they function independently with rather well understood and 
predictable behavior.  However, when these parts become more densely clustered 
geographically or interconnected operationally, they form a larger system with complex 
performance and they begin to affect and interact with non-built systems.  In this 
category, the infrastructure draws its complexity primarily from its network 
characteristics.  Examples, include; transport systems (highways, railroads and 
waterways), sewage systems, power distribution networks, and communication networks.  
Large-scale systems with similar characteristics can also be defined with respect to 
housing.  For example, each housing unit is a relatively small project, but collections of 
them create neighborhood communities and suburbs that have significant environmental, 
social, and political consequences, that are not dominant in a single unit. 
 
Prior to World War II, most projects of the first type (commonly referred to as 
“megaprojects” or “macroprojects”) were basically conceived by visionary individuals, 
who championed their cause; Suez Canal, Panama Canal, Brooklyn Bridge are typical 
examples.  The technical feasibility and cost effectiveness of these projects were often 
dubious, and were mostly wrapped in national flags and national pride.  Fortunately a 
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very small number of these visionary schemes were ever realized.  When they were 
undertaken, however, they had, without exception, substantial cost overrun, longer time 
to finish, and significant unanticipated political, social, economic and environmental 
consequences. 
 
It is only very recent, since World War II, that the scope and scale of some industrial 
projects have placed them in the megaproject league, and have forced corporations such 
as petrochemicals, utilities, oil and gas, and automobile to seek a more holistic approach 
to their undertaking.  For example, if one looks at new auto manufacturing plants and 
considers the extent of involvement and interest of local communities, states and even 
nations (e.g., Mexico and Brazil) in locating such plants in their territories, one can begin 
to gauge the complexity and magnitude of the consequences of such undertakings.  
Likewise, when viewed from the perspective of the auto industry and the intangible 
factors that enter into the appraisal and planning of new manufacturing facilities, it is 
apparent that the engineering and construction aspects of the project seldom are a 
decisive factor, even thought they may involve expenditures of several billion dollars. 
 
The construction phase of megaprojects requires the concentration of large amounts of 
resources (manpower, equipment and materials) in a very limited physical area over a 
finite number of years.  The primary skill required is as much managerial as it is 
technological.  Thus the success or failure of these projects is highly dependent on the 
quality of the management team.  The management skills required, in addition to having a 
program for the control of resource utilization, include the ability to build consensus 
among the three key parties involved; i.e.; financier (owner), engineer (designer), and 
contractor (builder).  Each of these parties has a different set of objectives and interests in 
the project.  For example, the financier is concerned with return on investment and thus 
gives emphasis to cost and schedule controls.  However, the contractor wants profit 
maximization and therefore may seek change orders, which increase costs and on many 
occasions actually prolong completion time.  Many complex and innovative contractual 
arrangements and management skills have been developed to avoid the inherent conflicts 
among the interests of the three parties.  These arrangements and skills are highly 
grounded in the scoio-cultural traditions of the parties, are contextual in nature, and not 
easy to transfer.  The core issue of concern in these megaprojects is to better understand 
the dynamics of the relationships among the three parties.  The users of the output of 
these megaprojects in industrial sectors are separated from the facilities and the units are 
operated by professionals.   
 
The second type of large-scale system (e.g., those consisting of a network of large 
number of simple elements) is interesting from the standpoint of system performance. 
While the construction phase of such systems is not complicated, any additions to or 
deletions from the system often create socio-economic concerns that significantly 
complicate the development of the public consensus needed for their construction, 
operation, and management.  The NIMBY (Not In My Backyard) syndrome is a typical 
manifestation of public concern over any change to the status quo of these systems.   
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In this type of system, owners, contractors and users usually have conflicting objectives, 
which require a consensus-building approach rather than an analytical approach to 
change.  Since these systems are by nature very pervasive, their significant interaction 
with social and natural environments create complexities that go well beyond their 
physical development. Transport systems in particular have been the prime example of 
this situation.  Over the past few decades, it has not been possible to add new transport 
facilities to the existing system in the U.S.  A few that have been built have not been 
scrutinized on a conventional economic-evaluation basis, their engineering feasibility has 
been taken for granted, and most have been built using the broader context of social 
desirability (the least common denominator).  For example, on several occasions 
transport facilities have been abandoned or intentionally underdesigned due to social, 
political, or environmental concerns.  A lack of understanding of these dimensions on the 
part of the engineering profession has been a primary cause of cost escalation, delay, 
reduction in scale and scope, and at times complete abandonment of projects.  Many in 
the engineering profession hold on to the belief that public hostility toward such projects 
is due to public ignorance rather than due to inadequacy of our engineering approach.   
 
This paper elaborates on the evolution of infrastructure systems design, construction and 
operation.  It attempts to demonstrate the sources of complexity and discuss the manner 
by which they come about and interact with our social, natural, and technological 
systems. 
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The Anatomy of Large Scale Systems 
Joel Moses 
 
EXTENDED ABSTRACT 
 
Most theoretical analyses of systems emphasize their behavior. In this paper we shall 
emphasize the role of organizational structure in influencing certain aspects of the 
behavior of systems, rather than the full behavior of the systems. There are several 
historical examples where structure was analyzed early on in order to gain a better 
understanding of systems. In medicine, for example, anatomy was studied well before we 
had a deep understanding of the role and behavior of subsystems or infrastructures of the 
body, such as blood flow. Different anatomical structures provide different advantages 
and disadvantages in coping with changes in the overall environment in which a living 
system is expected to operate. 
 
We shall emphasize three major organizational structures for large scale systems. The 
network structure permits one to create a very large system, albeit one which may not be 
easy to control. The tree structure is a hierarchical form that is very common, both in 
human organizations and in engineered physical or abstract systems. The layered 
structure is also a hierarchical form, but is not as well understood. Layered structures 
occur in large partnerships and in physical systems that have a clear separation between 
the layers. We claim that large scale systems employ mixtures of these forms. We 
indicate advantages and disadvantages of these three generic organizational forms. We 
also relate the forms to certain system properties, in particular flexibility. Finally, we 
relate organizational structures and system properties to the notion of structural 
complexity. 
 
Every system will have some amount of complexity, and large scale versions of systems 
will tend to have more complexity than smaller versions. What frustrates people is when 
a system is so overly complex that it is difficult to make additional changes in it. In fact, 
many Americans seem to believe that this is a property of all large scale systems. How 
does an overly complex system arise? Initially tree structured systems will appear 
relatively simple. As requests for changes are made, there are two basic strategies for 
implementing them. One is to restructure the system from scratch for each request, 
thereby keeping the revised system relatively simple. Since this approach is quite time 
consuming and expensive for large scale systems, the alternative approach is usually 
chosen. This approach reuses most of the components or modules of the original system, 
and modifies some of the interconnections among them. Such modifications will usually 
lead to non-standard structures and greatly increase the structural complexity of the 
resulting system. The reason that nearly all new connections in a tree structure are non-
standard is that the only legal connections are to one’s parent node and to one’s children 
nodes, and unless the new connection is to a new child node it will be non-standard. 
 
Layered structures have an architecture that permits certain types of changes to be made 
easily. This is because nodes at one layer can be legally connected to any node at the 
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layer immediately above, immediately below or the same layer as them. Thus changes in 
specifications that require nodes to be connected to other nodes can usually be readily 
made, and with relatively little growth in structural complexity. 
 
Large scale infrastructures, such as ones for electric power and telecommunication, can 
be viewed as having three layers. The bottom layer in the electric power system has the 
generating plants, such as nuclear power plants. The middle layer has the transmission 
and distribution systems, and the top layer has the end users, such as refrigerators. Of 
greatest interest to us is the middle layer that may contain both networks and hierarchies. 
 
Human organizations may benefit from mixtures of organizational structures. For 
example, a tree structured project organization may overlay a layered structure used for 
mentoring. If middle managers play a dual role as project managers and as mentors in 
such an overlayed structure, we have an alternative to a matrix system, and one that we 
believe is used in some large Japanese organizations.  
 
What gives layered systems and networks their particular advantage in situations 
involving high rates of change is their flexibility. We measure flexibility in a hierarchical 
system by the number of paths from the top node to the end nodes, counting loops just 
once. Tree structures have a unique path to each end node, and are thus relatively 
inflexible. Layered systems have a geometrically growing number of paths, depending on 
the number of layers. Adding connections to a tree structured system adds relatively little 
to its flexibility at a non-trivial increase in structural complexity, due to the non-standard 
nature of most new connections. 
 
Tree structured systems are often products of a reductionistic approach to design. 
Layered systems tend, on the other hand, to be relatively holistic, since nodes at the same 
layer are at the same level of abstraction. Product platforms are closely related to layers, 
and usually arise from the creation of standards. Neither of these architectures is ideal 
when the rate of change is very high. In such cases, small team-based architectures may 
be most appropriate.  
 
Historically, different system philosophers have tended to emphasize one or the other of 
these two hierarchical architectures. For example, Plato thought in terms of layered 
systems, and Aristotle, his student, emphasized tree structures. Various cultures 
emphasized one of these two forms at different times in the past. Cultures based on 
multiple religions, such as the Japanese or German cultures, can simultaneously have the 
advantages (and disadvantages) of both of these architectures. 
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Lessons from the Lean Aerospace Initiative 
Prof. Earll Murman and Prof. Thomas Allen, Co-Directors Lean Aerospace Initiative 
 
Top Level Issues 
The intellectual foundations of Engineering Systems will develop in large part, from 
empirical research and eventual codification. While large-scale systems have been 
studied in the past, usually this has been of single, unique projects or programs. What is 
required now is a more systematic and programmatic approach. Although it is difficult to 
find multiple examples for comparative analysis, the effort to do so must be made. It is 
only through multiple observations that there can be any hope for generalizing results and 
for gaining genuine theoretical insights. Simple project reports or case studies can often 
provide leads for further investigation, but that investigation must be done on a 
systematic and rigorous basis, if we are truly to learn anything.  
 
Such an ambitious goal is not going to be accomplished easily. It will require field 
observation of the development and implementation of multiple systems. Aside from the 
difficulty of finding appropriate examples, this implies satisfying the needs of many 
stakeholders. Experience tells us that gaining access to live field data requires not only 
minimizing interference but frequently requires a quid pro quo. We have to combine 
some short term payoff for stakeholders as well as a long term increase in understanding. 
This short term goal is often easy to fulfill in the form of providing a "benchmark" data 
or advice to the stakeholders. It must be included in the research plan, however, and 
offered at the time of negotiation for access. Many times there may be a variety of 
stakeholders, not all of whom will be satisfied with any particular payoff (e.g. 
management and organized labor). This aspect must also be taken into account in initial 
planning and incorporated into the business plan. 
 
Real World Research 
(There are a number of textbooks covering these issues, so we will only highlight here.) 
Field research differs from laboratory research primarily in the difficulty of measuring 
and controlling variables. For the results to be valuable to either theorists or managers 
there must be some outcome or dependent variable to which observations can be related. 
In the case of managers, this outcome is usually preferred in the form of some indicator 
of individual, group or organizational performance.  The chief difficulty that this presents 
is that there are usually a very large number of contributors to such an outcome measure 
(Take, for example, the determinants of corporate performance.) This then requires either 
the gathering of a very large data sample (in the hope that uncontrolled variables will be 
randomized) or the controlling of all but the variables that are directly under study or 
manipulation. Both of these solutions are very difficult and usually impossible to 
implement. As a compromise, we are thus driven to measurement at a lower level of 
analysis (e.g. organizational sub-unit, group or individual). The choice of level or unit of 
analysis is critical and frequently a study can be done at several levels, provided that clear 
distinctions are made in both the analysis and presentation of the data. 
 
Despite all of these difficulties, good field research on engineering systems can be 
accomplished even to the extent of field experiment. Changes can be introduced, for 
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example, into the way in which a system development is managed. This can enable the 
measurement of "before and after" effects. Frequently this can be done with inclusion of a 
control group receiving all but the experimental change (Cf Allen and Gerstberger, 19--). 
At other times studies can be "trimmed" as is often done in agricultural research and in 
the study of human development. Two activities many be underway in different 
organizations or in different parts of the same organization. If different approaches are 
taken, this provides a natural experiment with many variables directly controlled (Cf., 
Allen, 1984). 
 
Field research often requires observation over an extended period of time. This can be 
both and aid and a difficulty. When events that occur over the time period can be 
observed or measured their effects can often be ascertained. When they occur unobserved 
and unmeasured, they may introduce noise leading to false conclusions.  
 
Learning Community 
The ideal way to organize a program of research in engineering Systems is to first 
identify all of the stakeholders. There may be a single government agency or firm or there 
may be several, organized in a consortium. Following this, one must identify all of the 
value streams. Where these conflict (and they often will) there needs to be identification 
of potential conflict and terms of engagement should be specified for managing such 
conflicts. For example, there is often a conflict between the academic need for open 
dissemination of knowledge and the industry need to protect knowledge for competitive 
advantage. There may sometimes be a need to discontinue a program and move to new 
challenges that conflict with a perceived need to maintain employment for those working 
on the program. Such conflicts can be managed, but they must be faced early and terms 
worked out.  
 
Once all stakeholder value streams have been identified, a management structure can be 
specified that recognizes the multiple value streams. Since there are usually some 
stakeholders who are more engaged in knowledge generation and others who are more 
concerned with knowledge application, a model can be laid out to guide research from 
knowledge generation to application and then through the cycle again and again.   
 
This recognizes and promotes mutual learning. If done properly, it can benefit all 
stakeholders. 
 
Reward Systems 
In pursuing field research, with a multiplicity of stakeholders, one must keep in mind the 
difference in reward systems facing different stakeholders. Managers in industry and 
government are rewarded for accomplishments that benefit their immediate employees.  
The time horizon for such benefits often varies as a function of managerial level. Very 
often senior management will recognize a long-term payoff from research and will enter 
into an agreement with university researchers. They will then, however, pass 
responsibility for managing the relationship to middle level managers, who may have a 
very different agenda with a much shorter time horizon. On the other side of the 
transaction, university faculty have a vested interest in education and research producing 
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knowledge for educational purposes. While all faculty are motivated to publish, senior 
faculty, already guaranteed security through tenure can afford to assume a long-term 
perspective in this regard. Junior faculty, facing an eventual tenure review, need to get 
their publication out to the academic community more rapidly. This, coupled with the 
fact that engineering systems research is only gradually becoming recognized as a 
legitimate subject (There are no recognized journals yet), makes it very risky for junior 
faculty to engage in engineering systems research.  
 
(The paper will expand on these and other related topic areas)  
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Lean Enterprises 
Deborah J. Nightingale 
 
Introduction 
Lean enterprises are increasingly important in achieving critical strategic goals such as 
responsiveness, cycle time and cost across all phases of the product life cycle. The Lean 
Aerospace Initiative defines a lean enterprise as: 
 
A lean enterprise is an integrated entity that efficiently creates value for 
its multiple stakeholders by employing lean principles and practices. 
 
Lean enterprises systematically employ lean thinking and as such are dynamic, 
knowledge-driven and customer focused — consistent with the definition of lean 
thinking. As a result, they are responsive to change. A lean enterprise is continuously 
evolving with its environment, seeking improvement and perfection.  The full benefits of 
lean can be realized only by re-thinking the entire enterprise:  its structure, policies, 
procedures, processes, management practices, reward systems, and external relationships 
with customers and suppliers. 
 
Enterprise Architecture 
What are the enterprise processes in a corporation, business unit, or government agency 
that need to be transformed in order for it to be a lean enterprise?   A generic lean 
enterprise architecture is used as the organizing framework, as shown in Figure 1.  The 
architecture is organized into three basic groups, each consisting of a number of 
enterprise level processes.  All of these processes must be transformed in order to achieve 
a lean enterprise. 
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Figure 1 
Generic Lean Enterprise Process Architecture 
 
 
 
Business Acquisition and Program Management
Requirements Definition
Develop Product and Process
Supply Chain Management
Produce Product
Distribute and Service Product
Finance
Information Technology
Human Resources
Quality Assurance
Facilities and Services
Environment, Health and Safety
Strategic Planning
Business Models
Managing Business Growth
Strategic Partnering
Organizational Structure and Integration
Transformation Management
Life Cycle Processes
Enabling Infrastructure Processes
Enterprise Leadership Processes
 
Life Cycle Processes:  These processes define the product life cycle, from initial 
conception through operational support and ultimate disposal.  These are the value 
stream activities that contribute directly to the creation of products, systems, or 
services delivered to the enterprise’s customers.   These processes reflect the lean 
view of an overall product lifecycle within which functions serve, as opposed to the 
more traditional paradigm that allows each function to suboptimize around its own 
operations. 
 
Enabling Infrastructure Processes:  These support the execution of Enterprise 
Leadership and Life Cycle processes.  The enabling processes provide supporting 
services to other organizational units whom they serve as internal customers.  Since 
they enable rather than directly result in enterprise success, they can be easily 
overlooked as sources of waste within the value stream.  In a lean enterprise, though, 
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they are reoriented to support the ‘Lifecycle Processes’. This can involve a major 
transformation in the operation of most support functions. 
 
Enterprise Leadership Processes:  These processes are developed and maintained by 
leadership to guide the activities of the enterprise.  They cut across all of the entities 
that make up the enterprise.  Enterprise leadership provides the direction and 
resources to break down barriers among and within Life Cycle Processes that result in 
wasted resources and reduced value to customers and stakeholders.  They also 
provide the leadership to transform the Enabling Processes to eliminate waste and 
improve responsiveness to the rest of the enterprise. 
 
Enterprises are comprised of processes, people/organizations, information, and enabling 
technologies.  To create value efficiently, these various elements of an enterprise must be 
appropriately linked and integrated. All portions of the organization (including life cycle 
as well as enabling processes such as Finance, IT, and HR) must operate in 
fundamentally different ways in the lean environment than they did under the mass 
paradigm. 
 
In general, there are three aspects involved in transforming the above processes to “lean:” 
 
1. First, the mission, procedures, practices, processes, and metrics of each 
organizational unit must be re-created, consistent with the requirements of a lean 
business model. 
2. Second, the fundamental principles of lean behavior (waste elimination, balanced 
flow, etc.) must be implemented within a framework of on-going continuous 
improvement. 
3. Third, the enterprise must be integrated across all the important dimensions: 
organizations, information, processes, and enabling infrastructures. 
 
Enterprise Stakeholders 
Additionally, in any complex enterprise there are multiple stakeholders.  These 
stakeholders may include customers, partners, suppliers, shareholders, employees, and 
society.  While lean principles were initially focused heavily on the customer, more 
recent enterprise research has revealed that the critical success factor for today’s 
enterprises is to balance the needs of all stakeholders.  This leads to new challenges and 
complexity for enterprise leadership. 
 
Leadership 
Transforming an entire enterprise to lean has revealed new challenges in the role of 
leadership in effecting a change of this magnitude. Issues such as multi-program process 
standardization, global seamless information flow, and enterprise-level optimization 
across multiple stakeholder objectives are critical strategic factors. Leadership 
commitment and alignment is critical to becoming a lean enterprise. Most critical are the 
overall enterprise leaders, who drive lean practices and principles from the top of the 
organization.  Enterprise change management and assessment methodologies have been 
developed to assist leaders in lean transformation. 
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Engineering System Issues     
Enterprises must be viewed holistically, with the above issues addressed as a complex 
integrated system.  Enterprises do not lend themselves to the traditional decomposition 
approach to complex systems.  Just as product development cannot be effectively 
accomplished without the extensive involvement of other life cycle processes such as 
manufacturing, supply chain, and the customer, so too must all three sections of the 
enterprise architecture be included in enterprise transformation and analysis.  Leadership 
and Enabling processes, in particular organizational and information infrastructure issues, 
must all be considered in parallel and in an integrated fashion – thus adding to the 
complexity of the enterprise as an engineered system. 
 
New methodologies, analysis approaches, and research on these complex system 
interrelationships are required. 
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JR East Professor 
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Complex, large-scale, integrated, open systems (CLIOS) are a class of systems of special 
interest in the Engineering Systems Division.   
 
A system is complex when it is composed of a group of related units (subsystems), for 
which the degree and nature of the relationships is imperfectly known.  Its overall 
behavior is difficult to predict, even when subsystem behavior is readily predictable.  
Further, the time-scales of various subsystems may be very different. 
 
CLIOS have impacts that are large in magnitude, and often long-lived and of large-scale 
geographical extent. 
 
Subsystems within CLIOS are integrated, closely coupled through feedback loops. 
 
By “open” we mean that CLIOS explicitly include social, political and economic aspects. 
 
Often CLIOS are counterintuitive in their behavior.  At the least, developing models that 
will predict their performance can be very difficult to do.  Often the performance 
measures for CLIOS are difficult to define and, perhaps, even difficult to agree about, 
depending upon your viewpoint.  In CLIOS there is often human agency involved. 
 
“Representing” a system as a CLIOS, diagrammatically and with text, can be a useful 
mechanism for understanding its underlying structure and behavior.  This paper defines 
the concept of a “CLIOS representation”, and then considers the Mexico City 
metropolitan area transportation/environmental system as an illustration of how a CLIOS 
representation can be utilized in practice. 
 
The motivation for a CLIOS representation is “nested complexity”.  The physical 
manifestation of Mexico City is a CLIOS in and of itself.  Nested complexity occurs 
when the physical CLIOS is being “managed” by a complex organizational and 
policymaking CLIOS, as is clearly the case in Mexico City. 
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Nested Complexity 
 
 
 policy 
 system 
 
 physical 
 system 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CLIOS Representation 
 
A CLIOS representation is a tool for capturing the key characteristics of a system in an 
organized systematic manner, so as to help the analyst avoid the omission of salient 
factors in both its physical manifestation and its organizational/institutional 
manifestation. 
 
We make an explicit distinction  between the physical system and 
institutional/organizational system,* but also explicitly represent the connection between 
the physical and institutional/organizational system, so as to understand the sources of 
nested complexity. 
 
This is largely a conceptual process -- we don’t expect to get quantitative results from the 
CLIOS representation -- rather, we hope for insight. 
 
* n.b. the institutional/organizational system is intended to capture the various 
stakeholders and their interests. 
 
 
Steps in a CLIOS Representation 
 
  1. Overarching description of CLIOS identifying major characteristics/ issues 
 
e.g., geographic scale, network structure, political structure, demographics….. 
 
Embedded herein is usually problem identification 
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  2. Identification of major subsystems and description of their key characteristics 
 
  3. Creation of the CLIOS diagram(s) -- N.B.  We often need CLIOS diagrams at 
various scales to represent the full richness of a system, so or example an 
"environment" subsystem may be expanded into a fuller representation considering 
various emissions, sources,…  Further, it may be convenient to draw CLIOS 
diagrams in a layered format (e.g., travelers and freight, physical system and 
institutional system). These diagrams contain subsystems and links showing the 
influences of subsystems upon one another. 
 
  4. Characterizing the nature of the links, including, for example 
 
Magnitude and direction of influence between subsystems 
Time frame of influence (immediate, long term…) 
Stochastic? 
Functional form (e.g., linear, nonlinear, threshold…) 
Adaptive 
Human agency 
Others usually associated with relations among organizations/institutions 
Hierarchical 
Command and control 
Advisory 
Info-sharing 
 
  5. Use the above results to "seek insight" about overall system behavior -- emergent 
behavior, considering, for example 
 
Interactions among multiple subsystems 
Fast-moving, high-influence interactions 
Strong positive feedback loops 
 
 
Post-CLIOS Representation Steps 
 
  6. Identification of key performance measures 
 
Per Capita Increase 
Air Quality 
. 
. 
. 
 
  7. Identification of Policy/Strategic Options Intended to Improve System Performance.  
Relate these options to the subsystems identified earlier.   
 
“Think through” the systemic impact of these options -- which extends to 
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quantitative analyses by various methods. 
 
  8. Option Evaluation and Selection 
 
  9. Implementation Strategy 
 
10. Post-Implementation Evaluation and Modification 
 
 
A CLIOS Representation of Mexico City 
 
The paper then applies the process to Mexico City, focusing on the relationship between 
transportation, land use, economic development and environmental (particularly air 
quality issues). 
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Ideas on Complexity in Systems – 20 Views 
Joseph M. Sussman 
JR East Professor 
Professor of Civil & Environmental Engineering  
and Engineering Systems 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
Cambridge, Massachusetts 
 
January 30, 2002 
 
The term “complexity” is used in many different ways when applied to systems.  The 
different uses of this term may depend upon the kind of system being characterized, or 
perhaps the disciplinary perspective being brought to bear. 
 
The purpose of this paper is to gather and comment upon different views of complexity, 
as espoused by different authors, and to highlight similarities and differences among 
these perspectives.  The purpose of the paper is not to make judgments among various 
complexity definitions, but rather to draw together the full richness of various intellectual 
perspectives about this concept, in order to understand better how complexity relates to 
the concept of engineering systems.   
 
I have either quoted directly or done my best to properly paraphrase these ideas.  I hope 
that this note will be useful as we begin to think through the field of engineering systems. 
 
Sources 
 
J. Morley English in Economics of Engineering and Social Systems; Complexity in 
internal management of a system (like the space program) vs. complexity in the 
objectives of a social system -- the space program had a simple objective -- a man on the 
moon and back safely by the end of the 1960s. 
 
Complexity as per Rechtin and Maier in “The Art of System Architecting”, page 7, 8. 
 
From “Dealing with Complexity”, by Flood and Carson, after Vemuri in “Modeling 
of Complex Systems”, 1978, New York: Academic Press. 
 
Complex situations are often partly or wholly unobservable, that is, measurement is noisy 
or unachievable (e.g., any attempt may destroy the integrity of the system). 
 
“Frontiers of Complexity” by Coveney and Highfield: 
 
“Complexity is the study of the behavior of macroscopic collections of such units that 
they are endowed with the potential to evolve in time.” 
 
From “The Economist”, June 5, 1999, an article entitled “Complex Equations”: 
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The article discusses “complexity management” in the context of banks and insurers, 
referencing work by BAH. 
 
From “Consilience:  The Unity of Knowledge” by Edward O. Wilson: 
 
Wilson discusses complexity theory, saying that “The greatest  challenge today, not just 
in cell biology but in all of science is the accurate and complete description of complex 
systems.” 
 
From “The Social Psychology of Organizations” by Katz and Kahn: 
 
They note that it is a big mistake to use biological metaphors to describe patterned human 
activity (Allport).  “Social systems are more contrived and biological systems and have 
no dependable life cycle.” 
 
From “Rescuing Prometheus” by Tom Hughes: 
 
“Social scientists and public intellectuals defined the baffling social complexity to which 
the systems approach enthusiasts believed they could respond as a problem involving 
indeterminacy, fragmentation, pluralism, contingency, ambivalence, and nonlinearity.  
Ecologists, molecular biologists, computer scientists and organizational theorists also 
found themselves in a world of complex systems.  Humanists -- architects and literary 
critics among them -- see complexity as a defining characteristic of a postmodern 
industrial world.” 
 
From “The Idea of Economic Complexity” by David Warsh (Boston Globe columnist) 
-- his ideas on economic complexity suggests that it is fundamentally hierarchical.  He 
does include some useful characterizations of the thinking of others, e.g.: 
 
John Von Neumann -- Redundancy is a complex system’s way of dealing with failure. 
 
John H. Holland:  Hidden Order:  How Adaptation Builds Complexity -- Holland is 
from the Santa Fe school of complexity.  This book captures much useful thinking.  He 
starts with “basic elements”:  agents, meta-agents and adaptation and the idea of ‘cas’, 
which stands for complex adaptive systems.  His metaphor is evolutionary biology 
although his examples are more broadly drawn, such  as a large city -- indeed, that is his 
first example.  He defines 4 properties -- aggregation, nonlinearity, flows and diversity 
and 3 mechanisms -- tagging internal models and building blocks.  He develops the idea 
of adaptive agents, rules and emergence and finally a software model called ‘echo’ based 
on sites, resources and strings which he uses on some simple cases to show how 
organization emerges. 
 
David Levy, UMASS/Boston, has several papers “Applications and Limitations of 
Complexity Theory in Organizational Theory and Strategy” to appear in “Handbook 
of Strategic Management”, and “Chaos Theory and Strategy:  Theory, Application, 
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Management Implications”, Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 15 (1994).  I quote 
from the former: 
 
“Comparing Chaos and Complexity Theory” 
 
Both chaos and complexity theory attempt to reconcile the essential unpredictability of 
non-linear dynamic systems with a sense of underlying order and structure.  There are, 
however, some significant differences between the two approaches.  Chaos theory 
searches for a small number of deterministic mathematical functions driving a system; in 
population models, for example, these functions might represent the fluctuations in the 
numbers of a species.  Network theory is less concerned with underlying simplicity; it 
tends to rely on brute computing power to model large numbers of nodes connected by 
simple logical rules.  Network theory is more interested in the emergent order and 
patterns in complex systems rather than trying to find a simple mathematical engine in 
the system.  Network models often try to capture the essence of interaction among the 
many agents in a system while chaos theory generally attempts to model some resultant 
outcome, such as prices or investment.” 
 
A. O. Hirschman and C. E. Lindblom, Economic Development, Research and 
Development, Policy Making:  Some Converging Views, Behavioral Science, vol. 7 
(1962), pp. 211-22.   
 
The authors consider the three fields of interest noted in the title, each of which can be 
characterized as a complex system in the social-political-economic realm.  They 
essentially argue that in each of these areas (drawing on the work of others), that 
unbalanced growth, apparently irrational strategies like duplication of resources and 
“confusion” and lack of communication may in fact be effective strategies in this context.  
Lindblom (in his earlier work) argues that there is a fallacy in thinking that “public policy 
questions can best be solved by attempting to understand them” and that there is almost 
never “sufficient agreement to provide adequate criteria for choosing among possible 
alternative policies”.  He goes on to discuss what he calls “disjointed incrementalism”, 
where no attempt at comprehensiveness is made in policy-making.  He argues that 
comprehensive policy-making in complex systems will always fail because of value 
conflicts, information inadequacies and general complexity beyond man’s intellectual 
capacities. 
 
W. Brian Arthur, On the Evolution of Complexity -- a chapter in Complexity by 
Cowens, Pines and Meltzer (eds.).   
 
Arthur speaks about three ways in which systems become more complex as they evolve.  
 
First, he discusses “ecosystems” (which may be organizational as well as biological in 
nature) in which individuals find niches within a complex web to fill.  He uses the pre- 
and post-automobile transportation industry as an example.  In the pre- period, buggy 
whip factories, etc., exploited niches; then the auto was invented and this quickly 
simplified the system, only to see it become more complex over time.  He notes that, “In 
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evolving systems, bursts of simplicity often cut through growing complexity and 
establish new bases upon which complexity can then grow.”  He cites Newton 
simplifying greatly the approach of Ptolemy, the latter based on a geocentric model of the 
solar system with tremendous complexity introduced to make it “work”.  Newton, with a 
few laws, developed the simple ideas which govern the solar-centric model and which 
had greatly superior predictive power. 
 
Second, Arthur discusses “structural deepening”, noting that to enhance performance, 
subsystems are added.  This refers to individuals (not ecosystems) becoming more 
complex.  The original design of the gas-turbine had one moving part.  Then to enhance 
performance, complexity -- subsystems -- were added. 
 
Third, he discusses complexity and evolution through “capturing software” like 
electricity or the mathematics of derivative trading on the financial market. 
 
Murray Gell-Mann, Complex Adaptive Systems -- book chapter in Complexity by 
Cowens, Pines and Meltzer (eds.).  
 
In an article on complex adaptive systems (CAS), Gell-Mann discusses the CAS cycle. 
 
“When we ask general questions bout the properties of CAS, as opposed to questions 
about specific subject matter such as computer science, immunology, economics, or 
policy matters, a useful way to proceed, in my opinion, is to refer to the parts of the CAS 
cycle. 
 
I. coarse graining,  
 
II. identification of perceived regularities, 
 
III. compression into a schema,  
 
IV. variation of schemata,  
 
V. application of schemata to the real world,  
 
VI. consequences in the real world exerting selection pressures that affect the 
competition among schemata, as well as four other sets of issues: 
 
VII. comparisons of time and space scales,  
 
VIII. inclusion of CAS in other CAS,  
 
IX. the special case of humans in the loop (directed evolution, artificial 
selection), and  
 
X. the special case of composite CAS consisting of many CAS” 
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Charles Perrow, Normal Accidents:  Living with High-Risk Technologies  
 
Perrow argues that our systems have become so complex and closely coupled that 
accidents are “normal” and cannot be assured against.  He discusses the idea of 
components being joined by complex interactions, so that the failure of one affects many 
others.  One idea of his is a “common-mode” component being used for several purposes 
(e.g., a pump) so that when it fails, a number of difficult-to-predict interactions occur.  
Further, these components are tightly coupled, so that failures propagate though the 
system quickly (and perhaps not visibly).  
 
He uses the word “linear” to contrast with “complex” when he describes interactions 
among subsystems (or components).  By linear he means interactions occur in an 
expected sequence.  By complex he means they occur in an unexpected sequence. 
 
John Sterman, in his book Business Dynamics:   
 
His underlying world view is system dynamics, emphasizing the “multi-loop, multi-state, 
nonlinear character of the feedback systems in which we live”.  He says that “natural and 
human systems have a high degree of dynamic complexity”.  He emphasizes that 
complexity is not caused simply “by the number of components in a system or the 
number of combinations one must consider in making a decision”.  The latter is 
combinatorial complexity, finding the optimal solution from a very, very large number of 
possibilities. 
 
Stuart Kauffman, At Home in the Universe:  The Search for the Laws of Self-
Organization and Complexity.   
 
Kauffman is of the Santa Fe School.  His framework is biology, primarily.  He thinks that 
Darwin’s chance and gradualism cannot have been enough of a theory of evolution to get 
us where we are today.  He writes about self-organizing systems as the additional and 
necessary piece of the puzzle. 
 
Complexity as per Joel Moses in his memo “Complexity and Flexibility”, which uses 
node and link structures. 
 
Detail complexity vs. dynamic complexity as per Peter Senge in “The Fifth Discipline”, 
page 71. 
 
Complexity as in CLIOS (Joseph Sussman, “The New Transportation Faculty:  The 
Evolution to Engineering Systems”, Transportation Quarterly, Summer 1999 and 
Introduction to Transportation Systems, Artech House Publishers, Boston, 2000.) 
 
The final paper will relate and contrast these various approaches. 
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Comparison of Information-Processing and Power-Processing Systems 
Based on Physical Laws and Constraints Applied to Design Methods and 
System Architecture 
 
Daniel Whitney 
It is widely agreed that the design methods and computer support of VLSI design 
are generally more mature than those of mechanical items.  Why is this so, and is there 
any hope of the gap being significantly closed?  This paper argues that there are 
fundamental reasons, that is, reasons based on natural phenomena, that keep mechanical 
design from approaching the ideal of VLSI design methods.  Profound differences in the 
architectures of VLSI systems and mechanical systems can be explained in a similar way.   
The essence of the argument is that VLSI and similar systems process information 
using minute amounts of power that are incidental to the information processing function.  
Mechanical systems like aircraft engines and cars process power itself, in large amounts, 
and are consequently subject to many constraints.  VLSI systems can afford to support 
huge mismatches in impedance between sources and loads, while mechanical systems 
must match impedances.  This virtually eliminates back-loading in VLSI systems.  Thus 
they can consist of standard load elements that can be designed independently of possible 
applications in systems, while mechanical components and systems must be designed 
together.  VLSI systems are more easily made modular as a result, while mechanical 
systems must be more integral.   
Over the last 40 years, nearly every mechanical device whose real function was to 
process information at low power, such as calculators, clocks, and multi-dial numerical 
displays, has been replaced by much faster, cheaper, and more accurate electronic 
versions.  The new versions are highly integral internally but are easy use as modules in 
highly interchangeable ways.  As a result, a whole technology has arisen around the plug 
and play principle.  It is exploited in electronic components, stereo systems, computer 
systems and peripherals, and many other applications.  Interface standards have been 
defined to assist this exploitation, including designs of electrical plugs, voltage levels, 
assignment of certain pins on the plug to certain functions, and so on.  In many ways, one 
can say that the existence of standard interfaces is the main enabler of modularity in 
many industries.  Why is it that this trend has not been extended to mechanical items that 
carry or operate at high power?  Why are typical high power or high stress things like 
airplane wings integral? 
I argue that the amount of power or the local power density (power concentrated in 
a given volume) involved in delivering the product’s functions severely limits a 
designer’s choices regarding its modularity.  High power items like car engines and 
aircraft wings need to economize on space, weight, and energy consumption while at the 
same time delivering multiple functions.  Modular designs would not do.  They would 
have too many parts, be too big, or weigh too much.  Their interfaces are subjected to 
considerable physical or thermal stress as part of the item’s main function.  If the 
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interfaces were independent spatially from the item and designed independently to 
standards, they would be too big or weigh too much.   
Information handling products operate at vanishingly small power levels.  An 
important reason why they are easier to modularize than power-handling products is that 
their interfaces can be standardized.  Products like microprocessors exchange and process 
information, which is expressed as low power electrical signals.  Only the logical level of 
these signals is important for the product’s function.  The interfaces are much bigger than 
they need to be to carry such small amounts of power.  For example, the conducting pins 
on electrical connectors that link disk drives to motherboards are subjected to more loads 
during plugging and unplugging than during normal operation.  Their size, shape, and 
strength are much larger than needed to carry out their main function of transferring 
information.  This excess shape can be standardized for interchangeability without 
compromising the main function.  This is why different kinds of disk drives can be used 
by one computer manufacturer in many models of computer.  The information itself can 
also be standardized, with the result that different disk drives (to continue the example) 
can be substituted functionally as well as physically with few incompatibilities. 
Power-handling items cannot easily be functionally substituted because power 
exchanges between them will not be efficient unless their power delivery and 
consumption characteristics are coordinated.  This is called impedance matching.  
Information-handling items exchange so little power that impedance matching is 
unnecessary.  The interfaces of power-handling items carry such large loads that there is 
little design slack left over to divert to interface standardization.   
In a typical low power system, the main functions are carried out by standard items 
whose behavior and design rules have been determined and verified ahead of time.  
Because these items do not load each other, they can be combined in practically 
unlimited ways without their behavior being modified.  Design effort and verification can 
then focus on systemic behavior.  By contrast, the main functions of a high power system 
are carried out by purpose-designed items, and standard pre-verified parts are low or no 
function things like screws.  Each part has to be independently verified and then the 
combination must be verified because the parts load each other and their behavior in the 
system is different from their behavior as independent items.  Thus module design and 
system design are intertwined in scope and time. 
To conquer the inherent complexity of low power systems, engineers exploit the 
modularity to build up systems layer by verified layer.  Independence and simplicity of 
function of these modules are the reason why such systems are designable at all.  Far 
fewer engineering hours are needed to design a 10 million part microprocessor than a 2 
million part airplane.  To achieve efficiency, designers of high power systems exploit the 
multi-functionality of the parts.  Such systems are thus harder to design and verify, but 
integrality is not regarded as a fatal barrier.  Attempts to design such systems modularly 
can result in kludges.  They appear as hilarious examples in Design for Assembly texts. 
It is debatable whether microprocessors carry out a single function, and the large 
power densities in microprocessors cause their internal elements to interact strongly, 
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making their design difficult to modularize.  Nevertheless, the majority of information-
handling items do one or a very few functions that can be clearly separated from each 
other internally and externally.  Designers of these items have considerable freedom to 
add or subtract functions.  This freedom is not often available in power-handling products 
because the higher power levels bring with them side effects like vibration, crack growth, 
and heat radiation that cannot be avoided.  More design effort typically goes into 
predicting and mitigating these side effects than goes into determining how to deliver the 
main functions.  Obviously, side effects cannot be standardized, and this is another reason 
why power-handling items cannot easily be substituted functionally. 
In summary, modularity in low power systems is enabled because 
• The modules do not back-load each other 
• They can therefore be designed and verified independently of how or where 
they will be used 
• Their interfaces carry low power or stress  
• Economy of scale exists for their manufacture 
• Interfaces do not deliver a main function or affect performance, do not 
consume major design resources like space, and can be defined and 
designed independently of the items they join 
On the other hand, integrality in high power systems is either mandated or exploited 
when 
• The modules back-load each other 
• Modules and the systems they constitute must therefore be designed 
together 
• Interfaces consume valuable resources and must be tailored to each 
application 
• High power creates side-effects that cannot be controlled separately from 
control of main functions 
• Integrality presents opportunities to consolidate functions 
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Defining Engineering Systems:  Investigating National Missile Defense 
(NMD) 
 
Brian Zuckerman 
 
 
The MIT Engineering Systems Division is currently building its intellectual framework.  
There is not yet consensus within ESD as to which tools and methods are central to the 
nascent engineering systems approach; which questions it should address; or the extent to 
which qualitative approaches should be incorporated into it.  The goal of this paper is to 
sharpen the debate by presenting multiple analyses of a single engineering system.  
Presenting varying perspectives would illuminate issues such as: 
 
• What types of questions should engineering systems practitioners ask when 
analyzing problems? 
• Which tools are fundamental, which are peripheral, and which lie outside its 
purview? 
• Is there a trade-off between the analytical rigor of different tools and the degree to 
which they can address questions the approach considers important? 
 
I propose using the national missile defense (NMD) concept as a vehicle for this 
investigation.  NMD is heavily based on technical artifacts; it requires a complex 
infrastructure to be deployed successfully; and it incorporates political and other 
qualitative components in addition to its technical design.  Moreover, the complexity of 
NMD facilitates the framing of analyses on multiple levels, and provides a vehicle for 
exploring the ramifications of different potential definitions of “engineering systems.” 
 
Paper Outline 
 
I propose taking three cuts at the NMD problem: 
 
• Technical description with probabilistic exercise 
• Engineering systems tools: system thinking/CLIOS; game theory, systems 
analysis  
• Relationship between Congressional appropriation and military procurement 
procedures and system architecture 
 
A. Technology/Probability 
 
The analysis will begin with a brief description of the technical elements of the 
system (radars, interceptors, command-and-control) and of several potential architectures 
of the system.  A brief probabilistic analysis showing how successful different potential 
architectures (midcourse, boost-phase) might be in intercepting potential attacks will 
show the system’s capabilities and the degree of confidence policy-makers might have in 
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preventing/deterring ballistic missile attacks on the United States.  The data from the 
probabilistic analysis will also be used in the second section of the paper. 
 
B. CLIOS/System Thinking 
 
 Initial CLIOS analysis has identified several characteristics of the NMD system.  
First, missile defenses themselves heavily integrated in the CLIOS sense, as there are 
several examples of feedback between subsystems that might lead to nonlinear behavior 
or even true emergent behavior (with the tracking radar and interceptors’ guidance 
systems one example).  Second, there is also coupling between US defense spending and 
nuclear posture and other countries’ spending and choices to build ballistic missiles – 
feedback that may be both positive and negative.  The CLIOS analysis suggests that the 
U.S. should couple the decision to build a missile defense with other programs designed 
to reduce feedback; possibilities include a more robust testing program and renewed 
emphasis on non-proliferation and strategic arms limitations.  
 
C. Game Theory 
 
 An alternative to representing NMD as a CLIOS or using system dynamics would 
be to represent it as a game or set of games.  Unlike CLIOS, game theory introduces 
choice explicitly into the representation of the system.  At the same time, game theory 
does not capture the interactions and feedback as neatly.  A game-theoretic analysis 
illuminates the differing responses of potentially unfriendly nations to a U.S. decision to 
proceed with a missile defense. 
 
D. Systems Analysis 
 
 A third engineering systems approach is to illustrate potential trade-offs between 
potential goals of an NMD system (size of attack, likelihood of intercept, geographic 
coverage of the system) and system designs, with their attendant costs and potential 
failure modes.  The analysis explores several proposed system architectures, and uses 
available technical and cost analyses to estimate the incremental performance and costs 
of more complex NMD designs.   
 
E. Likely Research and Appropriations Decisions 
 
 The final look would focus on how Congress and the military purchase weapons, 
and project how appropriations policies would interact with any missile defense system 
design.  This view would be the inverse of the traditional engineering systems approach.  
Rather than starting with a set of goals and examining which combinations of 
technologies meet those goals at minimum cost, it instead starts with how the system 
might be purchased and where it might be deployed, with the technology and the goals of 
the system appearing as constraints in a qualitative analysis.  I hypothesize that the 
military and the Congress are likely to purchase a broader range of interceptors than what 
the technical analysis would suggest, and to purchase fewer supporting systems (early 
warning radars, testing).  Individual segments of the system may be less reliable and 
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effective, but the system on the whole is likely to be at least as effective.  It is also likely 
to be considerably more costly. 
 
Fundamental Principles for Engineering Systems 
 
This work suggests some simple engineering systems principles, including: 
 
• No single analysis method is sufficient to describe a system; using multiple 
perspectives simultaneously can deepen insights 
• Organizational realities deflect systems away from “optimal” performance to 
allow other goals to be met 
